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SUMMARY 
The primary focus of this research study is on the development 
and analysis of analytical models for goal formulation and resource 
allocation in an organizational system comprised of three major classes 
of participants: top level managers, middle level administrators, and 
clients of the organization. 
A goal programming formulation of an overall problem facing the 
organizational decision system is given and the problem is decomposed 
using a goal partitioning approach. The decomposed problem consists of 
a master problem, which is viewed as being solved by top level manage­
ment, and two types of subproblems, one associated with the middle 
level management and the other associated with the organizational client. 
The solution procedure reflects the interaction and information flow 
between middle level management and top management and between client 
and top management. Several attributes of the model are consistent with 
observed behavior in organizations. 
Three models, which represent three distinct decision situations 
which may occur when the organization has one output and multiple 
clients, are presented. The first model describes a situation in which 
the top management desires to minimize the dissatisfaction of the middle 
level management and the sum of weighted client dissatisfactions with 
the product or service of the organization. The second model describes 
a situation in which either it is necessary to "target" or select one 
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of many clients or it is necessary to keep the dissatisfaction of all 
clients within threshold levels given a "target" client. The third 
model describes a situation in which the top management desires to mini­
mize the dissatisfaction of the middle level management and the maximum 
client dissatisfaction with the organization's output. 
The above-mentioned models are normative and are developed to 
aid in designing better interaction and coordination processes. In ad­
dition, several descriptive models, which reflect observed behavioral 
interactions, are developed. One description considers the client's 
influence upon the top management, termed indirect influence. A second 
description considers the client's influence directly upon the middle 
level management, termed direct influence. Two methods of describing a 
project redesign phase are presented. Several opportunities for addi­





The recent development of large-scale mathematical programming 
decomposition models and algorithms [65,6,35,36,9,107,15,57,60,70,69, 
105,46,67,106] which appear to resemble interactions and information 
flows in hierarchically decentralized organizations, has led operations 
researchers toward the development of models which portray the organi­
zational information flows associated with the resource allocation 
process. However, some of the recent models [91,30,45] consider only 
implicitly the effect of the clients or consumers of the organization in 
influencing resource allocation decisions made within the organization. 
The models concentrate upon the interaction between superiors and sub­
ordinates, which interaction occurs for the purpose of establishing 
goals and objectives for subordinate management units and determining 
future resource allocation levels. 
Recent organizational, marketing, and advertising research 
studies [71,51,58,101,32,41,37,39,50,7,1,3,13,27,53,64,78] either pro­
vide evidence or propose hypotheses which emphasize the influence of the 
environment surrounding the organization. More specifically, the empha­
sis is on the power of a person or group outside the organization to 
produce effects without the exertion of any physical force or authority. 
In many situations this person or group is referred to as the client or 
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consumer. In the simplest case, a client may affect the decision­
making process in an organization by his decision whether or not to buy 
or utilize a product or service produced or provided by the organiza­
tion. In a more complex situation, the client may provide information 
relating to his dissatisfaction or preference which might be used by the 
organizational decision makers to produce a product or provide a service 
which is more satisfactory or more useful to the client. 
Aim 
The purpose of this research is to develop analytical models of 
a resource allocation-decision making process within a hierarchical 
decentralized organization which include an explicit incorporation of 
client influence upon organizational output and product redesign. The 
decision-making process is analyzed via mathematical programming models. 
It is hoped that this research will aid in further bridging the gap be­
tween behavioral sciences and operations research. 
Scope of the Research 
This study is specifically directed toward the development of 
analytical models which can be analyzed to provide insight into the re­
source allocation process. The process is viewed as iterative in 
nature, and since it takes place over time, a model of the process, 
which reflects changes over time, is used. For convenience, linear 
models are assumed. In addition, it is assumed that behaviors of indi­
viduals within the organization and the clients of the organization are 
goal directed. A goal programming model is seen to have desirable 
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properties in describing goal directed behavior and is selected as a 
component in a proposed organizational system model. An organizational 
system model is proposed which incorporates client interaction in the 
decision-making process as well as superordinate-subordinate inter­
action. 
Chapter I is an introduction and includes the background, aim and 
scope of this research. 
Chapter II presents a formal definition of an organization, a 
discussion of goal-oriented and systems-oriented approaches of viewing 
organizations, a consideration of some of the difficulties associated 
with using quantitative performance measurements in organizations, and 
a basis for proposing an organizational system model. 
Chapter III reviews the models of Goodwin [50], Baker [7], 
Ruefli [91], Collomb [30] and Freeland [45]. A review of the mathe­
matical programming literature dealing with decomposition as applied to 
the organizational decision-making process is presented. 
In Chapter IV, a mathematical model of an organizational system 
model based on Freeland1s goal-partitioning model is presented. Two 
approaches to client intervention are modeled: (1) the first approach 
allows an administrator to determine an output for the client which may 
not satisfy client-related objectives, and (2) the second approach 
allows no freedom to an administrator with regard to satisfying client-
related objectives. The partitioning model requires interaction with 
the client at each iteration. Thus the client is treated similar to an 
additional subordinate unit. A decision model for product redesign is 
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also presented. The models describe a situation in which the organiza­
tion produces one product or service and there is only one client or 
client group. 
Chapter V presents three decision rules when there is one product 
or service and there are several groups of clients. It is assumed that 
individuals within a group have a homogeneous set of needs and the needs 
are seen as heterogeneous between groups. The three rules considered 
are 
1. Minimizing the sum of internal tension and weighted client 
dissatisfaction. 
2. Targeting a client group which minimizes the sum of internal 
tension and client dissatisfaction. 
3. Minimizing the sum of internal tension and maximum client 
dissatisfaction. 
Chapter VI presents several descriptive models of the interaction 
among the central unit, management units and client. The models, al­
though similar in nature to those considered in Chapter IV, consider 
client evaluation of the actual output of the organization which occurs 
only after the central unit—management unit interaction results in a 
satisfactory allocation of resources and requirements within the organi­
zation. Two processes of client influence—indirect, in which the 
client attempts to influence the central unit, and direct, in which the 
client seeks to influence the management units—are described. In addi­
tion, two models of the project redesign process are described. 




SINGLE GOAL AND SYSTEM APPROACHES 
TO STUDYING ORGANIZATIONS 
Students of organization theory have proposed many definitions of 
organizations, have used varying assumptions and have changed the obser­
vation viewpoint in their studies. The purposes of this chapter are to 
define a formal organization, to define a set of postulates which will 
be used throughout this dissertation, to discuss both a goal-oriented 
and a systems-oriented approach to viewing organizations, and to present 
the arguments for selecting a systems-oriented approach. In addition, 
the difficulties encountered in attempting to use quantitative perform­
ance measurements are considered, the purpose of using a mathematical 
analysis is discussed, and finally an organizational system approach to 
studying organizations is defined. 
Definition of an Organization 
The organization is usually thought of as the company, the 
corporation, the university, the welfare agency, etc. Chester Barnard's 
[10] definition of an organization is an acceptable one throughout this 
thesis. Barnard [10] defines a formal organization as a "system of 
consciously coordinated personal activities or forces of two or more 
persons" [10, p.73]. The formal organization is thus a cooperative 
system which is "a complex of physical, biological, personal and social 
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components which are in a systematic relationship by reason of the co­
operation of two or more persons for at least one definitive end" [10, 
p. 63]. The definitive end that Barnard relates to may be considered as 
the purpose or goal of 1he organization. However, it is well to note the 
difference between a purpose and a goal. Webster (1963) defines purpose 
as "the object for which something exists or is done" and goal as "an 
object or end that one strives to attain." Purpose may be viewed as an 
external or impersonal object, hence, Barnard postulates that a common 
purpose of an organization is necessarily an external, impersonal, 
objective thing. On the other hand, a goal may be perceived as an in­
ternal or personal object. Thus, the use of the term purpose in refer­
ence to an organization appears to connote a depersonalization of an 
organization. The organization is treated as an object or thing rather 
than a collection of individuals in cooperation. But it is the indi­
vidual working with other individuals, not the building, the machines or 
the product, which constitutes an organization. Therefore, the defini­
tive end, toward which the individuals in a coordinated effort strive to 
attain, should be described in terms of a goal or goals. 
At this point, however, it is not at all clear as to whether an 
individual or organization actually has a goal or whether it only ap­
pears to the students of organizations that an individual or organiza­
tion has a goal. Economists refer to the profit motive of an organiza­
tion as its goal and sociologists refer to organizational survival as an 
organization's ultimate goal. But does this mean that an organization, 
which does not make a profit, does not have a profit goal, or an 
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organization, which does not survive, does not have survival as a goal? 
Or, have these respective organizations simply failed in reaching their 
goals? Perhaps a more basic question would be, do organizations actu­
ally have goals? To alleviate the difficulty involved in attempting to 
answer these questions, the following set of postulates is given: 
1. It is assumed that organizations do have one or more 
goals which can be specified. 
2. Individuals in the organization may have goals which 
are not shared by all individuals in the organization. 
A Single Goal Approach to Organizations 
The single goal approach to organizations suggests that there 
exists only one major unifying goal in the organization. And in evalu­
ating the performance of an organization, multiple measures are often 
regarded as a poor substitute for the one best index of performance 
[52, p.1178]. 
A review of the literature related to business organizations by 
Dill [38] reveals that 
. . . the simplest and strongest hypothesis about the goals 
of business organizations is that they are concerned only 
with profit and in all that they do, they strive to maximize 
profit. . . . Ideologically, the single-minded emphasis on 
profits is regarded by many as the cornerstone to the success 
and survival of a capitalistic society [38, p.1073]. 
However, Dill further indicates that proof of this emphasis is scarce. 
The mathematical programming literature gives abundant examples 
in which maximization of profit is the single objective function. Col­
lomb [30] writes, 
The classical profit maximization model starts from the idea that 
individuals or corporations engage in business, for most of them, 
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with the avowed purpose of making a profit, and that profit-
seeking behavior seems to have been the essential driver of 
business entities in the western economies. This descriptive 
view is backed up by some normative considerations drawn from 
economic theory [30, p.8]. 
Traditionally, much of the work that has been conducted in 
studies attempting to measure the effectiveness of organizations has 
utilized the goal-oriented approach as is evidenced in an inventory of 
organizational effectiveness by Price [85]. Price presents an analysis 
of 50 studies related to organizational effectiveness. Price defines 
effectiveness, the dependent variable in his study, as the degree of 
goal achievement. Also, he focuses upon operative rather than what may 
be considered official goals. Operative goals "designate the ends 
sought through the actual operating policies of the organization" as 
opposed to the official goals which are the "general purposes of the 
organization as put forth in the charter, annual reports, public state­
ments by key executives and other pronouncements" [85, p.855]. Price 
indicates that there exists a problem of standardizing a measure of 
effectiveness since relatively few studies of organizations have dealt 
explicitly with effectiveness and when they have, "diverse measures of 
effectiveness have been used" [85, p.5]. 
• In Price's inventory, the most generally used measures of effec­
tiveness are productivity, conformity, morale, adaptiveness (i.e., the 
degree of flexibility), and institutionalization (i.e. the degree to 
which the decisions of the social system are supported by its environ­
ment). But in all cases, if productivity and some other measure were 
used, productivity was assumed to be most related to effectiveness and 
i 
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thus took precedence in the analysis. 
In the single goal approach to organizations, the organization is 
viewed as a group of individuals bonded by a common objective, usually 
profit for a business concern, and interaction with the environment 
would be necessary only if that interaction aided in attainment of the 
common goal. 
A Systems Approach to Organizations 
Parsons [83] is one of the first individuals to place a high 
emphasis on using a systems approach in viewing an organization and the 
effectiveness of an organization. A system may be defined as a set of 
components and of the relationships which hold among those components. 
Parsons defines an organization as a "social system which contributes to 
a major function of a more comprehensive system, usually society" [83, 
p.63], The basis for a systems approach, then, is not specifically a 
goal-attainment approach, which tends to place the organization in a 
semi-vacuum where the only interaction with an outside environment is 
for the achievement of a specific purpose. Instead, as a subsystem, 
the organization must function as an integral component in which the 
. . . value system of the organization must imply basic accept­
ance of the more generalized values of the superordinate system 
. . . [and] the most essential feature of the value system of 
an organization is the evaluative legitimation of its place or 
"role" in the superordinate system [83, p.67-8], 
In a criticism of Parsons' proposal, Seashore and Yuchtman [93] indicate 
that he 
. . . failed to adhere to the organizational frame of reference; 
for Parsons, organizational effectiveness lay in the functional 
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contribution of the organization to meeting the needs of the 
larger society. This solution is not tenable, for it merely 
shifts the same problem to a higher level of social organiza­
tion [93, p.392]. 
Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum [49] have viewed the organization at 
a lower system level. They consider the organization as being a system 
itself rather than a part of a larger society. In this context, they 
define the effectiveness of an organization as "the extent to which an 
organization as a social system, given certain resources and means, 
fulfills its objectives without incapacitating its means and resources 
and without placing undue strain upon its membership" [4-9, p.535-6]. 
Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum propose three general criteria for measuring 
the effectiveness of an organization: organizational productivity, 
organizational flexibility and the absence of strain, tension or con­
flict. Organizational flexibility, that is, the ability to adapt to its 
environment, and reduction of strain or tension are going to be major 
considerations of the analytical models developed in later chapters. 
Etzioni [42] also suggests the use of a system model in measuring 
effectiveness and comments on its advantages over a purely goal-oriented 
model. The shortcomings of the goal model are suggested by the fact 
that an organization does not realize its goals effectively and/or an 
organization may have different goals than it claims to have. In addi­
tion, for the "cultural images [goals] to be realized, [they] require an 
investment of means. Since the means needed are always larger than the 
means available, social units are always less perfect than their cultural 
anticipations" [42, p.258-9]. The implication is that entrepreneurs, 
boards of directors and organizational executives are guilty of making 
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grandiose statements regarding organizational objectives. 
Katz and Kahn [62] utilize an open system theory model of an 
energic input-output system as proposed by von Bertalanffy. In the 
model, the basic criteria for identifying and determining the function 
of the system are (1) tracing the patterns of energy exchange as it re­
sults in output and (2) ascertaining how the output is translated into 
energy which reactivates the pattern. The concept of energy is used in 
the broadest sense as the authors point out: 
The energy reinforcing cycle of activities can derive from 
some exchange of the product in the external world or from 
the activity itself. In the former instance, the industrial 
concern utilizes raw materials and human labor to turn out a 
product which is marketed, and the monetary return is used to 
obtain more raw material and labor to perpetuate the cycle of 
activities. In the latter instance, the voluntary organization 
can provide expressive satisfaction to its members so that the 
energy revival comes directly from the organizational activity 
itself [62, p.20]. 
Using the energy concept, Katz and Kahn define organizational 
effectiveness as "the extent to which all forms of energic return to the 
organization are maximized" [62, p.165], More specifically, it is the 
maximization of return to the organization by economic and technical 
means and by political means, where political means may be both external 
and internal. For example, an internal political means would be attain­
ing more productivity from an employee for each wage dollar, whereas an 
external political means might be the attraction of additional subsi­
dies . 
The authors explicitly point out that various frames of reference 
may be used to study and analyze the organization. Although they view 
effectiveness from the point of view of an organization, one might also 
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view Irom a lesser frame, e.g. the individual member or the group, or 
from a loftier frame, e.g. the society of which the organization is a 
component. 
In viewing the organization as an open system, Lawrence and 
Lorsch [71] examine the connection between the varying technical and 
economic conditions outside the organization and the patterns of organi­
zation and administration that lead to successful economic performance. 
The authors state: 
Few efforts have been made, until very recently, to understand 
their [large organizations'] functioning as a whole. . . . 
The difficulty is that the essential organizational requirements 
for effective performance of one task under one set of economic 
and technical conditions may not be the same as those for other 
tasks with different circumstances [71, p2]. 
Restricting themselves to large organizations, the authors indicate con­
cern about two important aspects of the functioning of systems. "First, 
as systems become large, they differentiate into parts, and the func­
tioning of these parts has to be integrated if the entire system is to 
be viable. . . . Second, an important function of any system is adapta­
tion to what goes on in the world outside" [71, p.7]. 
Based on experimental studies, Lawrence and Lorsch develop a 
"contingency theory" of organizations. They state that "the basic 
assumption underlying such a theory, which the findings of this study 
strongly support, is that organizational variables are in a complex 
interrelationship with one another and the environment" [71, p.157]. 
Six studies, concerned with the various ways in which organizations are 
designed in terms of structure and important managerial practices, and 
the contingent relation this bears to their performance of different 
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tasks in different environments, are reviewed. These studies include 
the works of Burns and Stalker [22], Woodward [110], Fouraker [44], 
Chandler [24], Udy [104], and Leavitt [72]. The important aspect of 
Lawrence and Lorsch's study is that they emphasize the environment and 
its impact upon decisions made within the organization. 
For the purposes of this thesis, an organizational system is 
meant to include the major participants in the decision-making process 
within the organization, the clients or consumers who utilize or buy 
the service or product of the organization and other environmental fac­
tors, such as legal or technological constraints. Of course, depending 
upon the type of organization, the number of major participant groups 
may vary. For example, Baker [7] focuses upon three major groups in a 
service organization: funders, servicers, and users. Whereas, Goodwin 
[50], in discussing a welfare system, considers donors, recipients, 
administrators, deliverers, and the constituency. 
In summary, the systems approach to the study of organizations 
leads the analyst to view the organization as a complete system, recog­
nizing its components, both mechanistic and humanistic, and its rela­
tionship to its environment, other organizations and society. The 
system viewpoint developed when theorists recognized that although spe­
cific goals are important, other variables, such as the maintenance 
function and the organization's relationship to its environment are also 
important. Industrial organizations are not in business for the sole 
purpose of making a profit. Therefore, the effectiveness of an organi­
zation cannot be based only on a profit measure or some measure of 
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productivity. As Etzioni clearly points out: 
The goal model leads to unrealistic, Utopian expectations, and 
hence to disappointments, which are well reflected in the liter­
ature of this type. The system model, on the other hand, depicts 
more realistically the difficulties encountered in introducing 
change into established systems, which function in a given en­
vironment. It leaves less room for the frustrations which must 
follow Utopian hopes [42, p.276], 
Decision makers in an organization have a limited number of re­
sources available for the purpose of achieving the multiple, realistic 
goals of the organizational system. The organizational system's goals, 
which would include goals of clients, is mentioned, rather than just the 
organization's goals, since it may be desirable or in fact necessary 
(for survival) to provide an output which achieves the goals or satis­
fies the needs of the client or consumer. Thus, the flexibility of an 
organization to respond to various client or consumer desires may be 
considered as an important criterion in analyzing organizational behav­
ior. 
Since the organization's goals are really goals of one or more 
individuals, who may be owners or in positions of power, it is not at 
all unlikely that other individuals in the organization have goals which 
may differ from established organizational goals. The resulting atmos­
phere in the organization would be one of non-cooperation, or at best 
not full cooperation. 
But given that administrators, who are not at the top level in 
an organization, seek to attain goals of the organization, goals of the 
client and their own goals and they are able to establish some set of 
priorities or trade-offs among the goals, then each administrator may 
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be regarded as vying for the limited resources which are assumed to be 
available for goal attainment. Thus the organization is faced with two 
problems: resource allocation and coordination. Top level adminis­
trators, on the other hand, are faced with the problem of coordinating 
the efforts of managers at lower levels and allocating resources to 
achieve a desirable output from a client's viewpoint, to achieve the 
organization's goals, and to minimize the tension or conflict among the 
managers. 
Difficulties of Quantitative Performance Measurements 
It appears that in order for administrators to allocate resources 
in the operation of an organization, some performance measures would be 
required. In moving from a conceptual realm, where it is recognized 
that organizations have multiple goals, to an operational mode, where 
the decisions must be justifiable, difficulties inherent in the measure­
ment and utilization of the information based upon multiple criteria 
become apparent. 
In a criticism of quantitative performance measurements, Ridgeway 
[86] comments: 
Quantitative performance measurements—whether single, multiple, 
or composite—are seen to have undesirable consequences for over­
all organization performance. . . . Even where performance meas­
ures are instituted purely for the purposes of information, they 
are probably interpreted as definitions of important aspects of 
that job or activity and hence have important implications for 
motivation of behavior [86, p.247]'. 
For example, Blau [19] reported that a single criterion of performance 
(number of interviews conducted) was used in a public employment agency. 
The interviewers thus tended to complete as many interviews as possible 
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without regard to placement of an individual in a job. 
If multiple criteria are used, measures may be in conflict with 
with one another. There might also be some confusion as to which cri­
teria are more important. Without a single composite measure, the indi­
vidual must make the trade-offs and establish priorities. Hence, im­
proved over-all performance becomes judgmental and the evaluation of 
performance improvement may vary between administrator and subordinate. 
Composite criteria appear to overcome the deficiencies of both a 
single criterion and multiple criteria. Weightings are given to each 
criterion and a single over-all measurement is determined by adding the 
weighted scores. For example, the American Institute of Management [4] 
in their Management of Excellent Managements use a composite of ten cri­
teria. Some problems may occur in using composite criteria, one of 
which is that effectiveness may be reduced if the means are not supplied 
or available to meet an increased performance goal. For example, 
Stedry [100] has presented experimental evidence which showed that per­
formance improves when goal set by an external source is slightly higher 
than a subject's aspiration level. However, if a goal is set at too 
high a level, then performance is poor and may even decrease, indicating 
that the subject, knowing that the performance goal could never be 
attained, simply gave up. But in general, it appears that a composite 
measure of effectiveness could be a useful approach in the study of 
organizations and it would fit within the systems theory framework. 
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An Organizational System Approach 
Once specific organizational objectives are established, these 
objectives could be broken down into specific goals for managers in 
various parts of the organization. However, it is also necessary to 
have information concerning the client's goals. Knowledge of specific 
attributes that a product or service should have for satisfying a cli­
ent, would be useful information that a manager could use in determining 
resource allocations. It is also important for top level administra­
tors to recognize that lower level decision makers have goals of their 
own which may influence decisions that are made. 
If quantitative measures are assumed to be available for making 
decisions , recent advances in the mathematical programming literature 
may allow a normative model of the decision-making process and the in­
formation flows among individuals in the organizational system. 
It would appear to be advantageous for the leaders of our organi­
zations , be they service or business organizations, to take the initia­
tive in developing specific and hopefully measurable, realistic objec­
tives toward which their organizations should strive. Specific state­
ments regarding short-term and long-term plans and objectives, with the 
recognition that organizational goals can and do change over time could 
greatly increase the comprehension and acceptance of the organization 
and its objectives by its managers, employees, consumers or clients, and 
society. In addition, explicit recognition of the priorities of the 
goals would aid the decision makers of the organization in determining 
how resources should be allocated throughout the organization. 
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I t is proposed that an organizational system model be developed 
which incorporates the needs of the organization's clients or customers, 
the objectives of the leaders of the organization in the form of organi­
zational goals, the goals of its lower level decision makers, and the 
legal or technological constraints imposed. In addition, the model 
should include the interactions which take place among various groups 
in the organizational system, since these interactions may impact the 
actual allocation of resources. 
In the next chapter, one descriptive and one analytical model, 
which appear to fit within an organizational system framework, are dis­
cussed. Also, three mathematical models, which appear to be useful in 
developing an organizational system model, are reviewed. 
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CHAPTER III 
MODELS OF INFORMATION FLOW AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
In the last chapter, the goal model and system model approaches 
to describing an organization were discussed. It was proposed that an 
organizational decision system model be developed, in which the goals of 
individuals within the organization and the goals of the clients of the 
organization would be important components along with the interactions 
which take place among the individuals within the system. The basic 
function of the model is to describe a resource allocation process in an 
organizational system which is influenced by goals and interactions. 
In this chapter, the works of Goodwin [50] and Baker [7] are seen to fit 
the organizational system framework. Baker's model appears to be one of 
the earliest attempts at an analytical analysis which explicitly 
includes a client as one of the groups influencing a resource allocation 
process. Works of Ruefli [91], Collomb [30], and Freeland [45] repre­
sent some of the latest work in using large-scale mathematical program­
ming decomposition models to describe resource allocation processes in 
decentralized organizations. The concepts presented by Baker and the 
goal-partitioning procedure proposed by Freeland are here used as a 
foundation for developing an organizational system model. 
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Goodwin's Model of a Welfare System 
Goodwin [50], inconsidering the welfare problem, recognizes six 
major groups, which he calls systems, interacting with one another. The 
donor group is comprised of persons who, "through legislation and ap­
propriations, define and provide resources for meeting the problem" 
[50, p.86]. Nationally, the donor group would be the members of Con­
gress and the Executive Office and locally it would be a board of com­
missioners. There is also a recipient group, which encompasses a de­
finable set of persons—those on welfare—who are granted funds by and 
are subject to the requirements of the donor group. Two intermediary 
groups, the administrative group and delivery group, are recognized. 
The administrative group comprises persons charged with over-all re­
sponsibility for administering the various programs that will presumably 
solve the "problem." The delivery group consists of the people who 
interact with recipients and actually provide, under the guidelines of 
the administrative group, the services commissioned by the donor group. 
Two additional "groups" are mentioned, but not explicitly considered by 
Goodwin. These two "groups" are the job-environment, which involves the 
job market and other environmental factors that affect the employability 
of welfare recipients, and the constituency, which consists of the vot­
ing and tax-paying groups in society. Figure 1 presents Goodwin's model 
of the groups (systems) involved in the operation of a national public 
program. The cross-hatched areas represent official important interac­
tions between persons in adjacent groups. As can be seen, no direct 
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Figure 1. Systems Involved in Operation of 
a National Public Program 
[50, p.89] 
Goodwin indicates, as presented in Figure 1, that recognition of 
the components and their interaction would be the first step in develop­
ing a model which accurately portrays the social problem-solving process. 
A second step would include the measurement and comparison of the goals 
and beliefs of the members of the different groups and the relationship 
they have to the actions of these groups. Goodwin then feels that it 
would be reasonable to undertake an experimental study to determine the 
impact of this information about the groups on the groups themselves. 
In viewing the donor group, Goodwin emphasizes the varying 
amounts of influence that individuals in the group possess. In addi­
tion, there exist different and sometimes conflicting viewpoints in 
designing a welfare system based upon the conservative as opposed to 
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the liberal stance. "Conservatives believe that increasing welfare pay­
ments would markedly decrease the productivity of our economic and 
social system" [50, p.90], Thus conservative legislators appear to 
favor policies with strict work requirements and low payments. Liberal 
legislators, on the other hand, appear to favor higher welfare payments 
and oppose harsh work requirements. Thus, it is evident that within the 
donor system some form of negotiation or bargaining may occur before a 
set of goals or mandates is established. 
Once mandates are determined, the two intermediary groups have 
the responsibility of effecting the donor's mandates. Goodwin implies 
that there are many ways in which an administrative group can fail to 
fulfill the goals of the donor system. "It may substitute goals, or it 
may organize operations on the basis of views that do not accurately 
portray events in the delivery, recipient, or job-environment systems" 
[50, p.93]. A closer inspection of the problem of failure leads one to 
realize that three major aspects need to be recognized: (1) the goals 
of the groups may be different; (2) the priorities associated with the 
goals may vary from group to group; and (3) perceptions of one group's 
goals by another group may be incorrect. Research by Korman [66] and 
Rosenberg [87] suggests that perceptions markedly affect not only inter­
action but also outcomes. 
Goodwin proposes that members of the several groups should be 
brought together by and with researchers in order to confront the fol­
lowing empirical findings: 
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1. Influential persons in the donor and intermediary systems 
misperceive the positive orientation of the poor toward work. 
2. Major blockages in the job-environment system prevent poor 
people from advancing in the work world. 
3. Federal work-training efforts have had in the past very 
little success in helping welfare recipients enter the 
work force. [50, p.96.] 
Goodwin suggests that such studies would aid in changing the views of 
members of different groups, which might lead toward altered policies 
and programs. 
It is important to note that Goodwin has recognized the major 
components in the total system, their interactions and perceptions. In 
the next section, an analytical model of a service organization, pro­
posed by Baker [7], is reviewed. It can be seen that the general inter­
action concepts and perceptions described by Goodwin can be formulated 
analytically. 
Baker's Analytical Model of 
a Service Organization 
Baker [7] specifies three classes of participants in the service 
organization: users, servicers, and funders. Users are those persons, 
who because of some need for service, have an opportunity to make use of 
the services offered by the service organization. Servicers are those 
persons who manage, operate, and maintain the service organization. Al­
though Baker recognizes that servicers are composed of both administra­
tive personnel and delivery personnel (in Goodwin's terms), he focuses 
primarily upon those servicers in the administrative system, that is, 
those who are responsible for determining policies and procedures. 
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Finally, the term "funders" refers to those persons who provide re­
sources which enable the service organization to operate. Baker speci­
fies that the funders typically reserve the right to evaluate the 
activities of the organization. He uses Blau and Scott's [20] defini­
tion of a service organization as "one whose prime beneficiary is the 
part of the public in direct contact with the organization, with whom 
and on whom its memberswork—in short, an organization whose basic func­
tion is to serve clients." 
Drawing from operations research and organization theory, Baker 
develops general analytical models which describe user, servicer and 
funder behavior, both as separate entities and in interaction. Although 
Baker bases his models on the service organization, it appears that the 
model is general enough to encompass the welfare system described by 
Goodwin and termed a commonweal by Blau and Scott and also, with a 
slight change in definitions, the business concern. Due to this pos­
sible wide application of Baker's model to various types of organiza­
tion, it is discussed in detail. 
Based upon a series of hypotheses, Baker defines the primary con­
siderations in the analytical model. Hypothesis 1 states that servicer 
behavior is goal directed. Let G be the set of servicer goals which can 
be partitioned into four subsets: G s are the servicer-oriented goals, 
Ĝ . are funder-oriented goals as perceived by the servicer, G^ are user-
oriented goals as perceived by the servicer, and G^ are any goals not 
classified as user, funder or servicer oriented. Hypothesis 2 states 
that the funders have a set of criteria which they utilize in evaluating 
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the performance of the service organization. Let C be the set of funder 
criteria which can be partitioned into four subsets C , C,., C , C , 
^ s ' f ' u x 
where the subscripts s, f, u, and x carry the same meanings as for 
servicer goals except that they are perceived by the funder. Hypothesis 
3 states that user behavior relative to the service organization is need 
directed, that is, the users have a set of needs and a set of expecta­
tions which guide their behavior relative to the service organization. 
Given a set of alternative sources of need satisfaction and a set of 
user needs related to the service organization, Baker hypothesizes that 
each user has an expectation of the rewards and costs associated with 
utilizing a particular source for satisfaction of one or more specific 
needs. Borrowing from the work of Thibaut and Kelly (1959), Baker pro- -
poses that the user has a standard or comparison level which is utilized 
in evaluating whether to start or continue with a particular source when 
one or more specific needs are present. 
Before defining a decision problem for the servicers, some addi­
tional definitions are helpful. 
1. P = {p ; k=l,2,...,s} is a set of operating strategies, i.e. 
policies, practices,or projects, which are feasible for the servicers to 
utilize in operating the service organization. 
2. H(v., ) is the servicer objective function where v., is the 
contribution to the servicer from goal g. if strategy p, is utilized at 
1 K 
a budget level b. 
3. M(w., ) is the funder evaluation where w„ is the contribu-
tion to the funder from criterion c. if strategy p, is utilized at a 
1 K 
budget level b. 
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4. R(y,, ) is the user need satisfaction function where y., is lb. J 1 k 
the contribution to the user from need n^ if strategy p k is utilized at a 
budget level b. 
If a single resource, for example, money, is considered, the 
funders may influence or have control over (1) the total available 
amount of the single resource, B, (2) the maximum amount of the resource 
to be utilized by policy k, B^, and (3) the minimum amount to be appro­
priated to policy k, B^. In addition to the budgetary constraints, the 
funders may impose upon the servicers minimum levels of satisfaction of 
the funder evaluation function, 3"̂ , and the user satisfaction function 
3 U, where 3"̂  equals the minimum M(w., ) which the funders view as satis-
k 
factory and 3 equals the minimum R ( y ^ ) which the funders view as 
k 
satisfactory. Then the fully constrained servicer decision problem is: 
Maximize H(v., ) (3-1) 
b k k 
such that 0 ^ B k ^ b k ^ B k for all p k (3-2) 
s I b < B (3-3) 
k=l k 
M(w., ) > 3 f (3-4) 
] b k 
R(y l h ) ̂  3 U (3-5) 
k 
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where b, is the budget proposed for policy k. 
K 
Baker mentions that two extensions are straightforward. First, a 
multi-resource allocation, instead of a single resource allocation can be 
incorporated. Second, since allocations are often made over time, a 
multiple time period model can be used to consider the concept of time. 
It is noted that the funders can exert control over the servicers 
by specification of the over-all budget, the minimum and maximum budget 
levels for specific operating policies, and minimum satisfaction levels 
3^ and 3 U. However, as Baker mentions, the ability of the funders to 
exert control over the servicers is dependent upon their ability to act 
as one unit. Similarly, Goodwin indicates that the conflicting views of 
the liberals and conservatives of the donor group in establishing man­
dates are often resolved only after long debates in congressional com­
mittees . 
In addition to exerting control over resources and specifying 
minimum satisfaction levels, Baker implies that the funders may attempt 
to modify the servicers' objective function by various methods of in­
fluence in order to increase agreement between Ĝ ., G^, and C^, C^, and 
the related v., and w., . Thus funders are seen as affecting servicer 
decisions by exerting control and/or exerting influence. 
Although the problem thus far is seen as one in which the funders 
exert control or attempt influence and the servicers allocate resources 
within the constraints imposed, there is usually a two-way interaction 
between the funders and servicers in the budgeting process. Constraints 
are passed from the funders to the servicers, and in turn, proposed 
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budgets are sent from the servicers to the funders. Thus, a re-
evaluation may occur and 1he funders may change the constraints or the 
funders may approve the budgets. If constraints are changed, the new 
constraints are again passed to the servicers and the process repeats 
itself until a budget is approved. 
Descriptions of this process of information flows during a budget 
establishment are given by Baker, Shumway, Maher, Souder and Rubenstein 
[8], and Shumway, et al. [95]. The authors describe the budget process 
as sequential in nature. Budget guidance flows from the highest admin­
istrative level through all intermediate levels to the lowest organiza­
tional levels. Each subordinate level then transmits a proposed budget 
allocation to the next higher level and the proposed budget allocations 
are aggregated and communicated to the next higher level until the 
highest level receives a proposed budget allocation. This process may 
be repeated until final approval is given by the top level. 
The action of the user in the system may be determined by the 
type of organization and product or service offered. Of course the most 
common responses of a user are to use or not use a service, e.g., if the 
organization is a library, or to buy or not buy a product, e.g., if the 
organization is a business. However, other user responses may include 
demonstration, boycotts, civil rights marches, letters of complaint, 
dissatisfaction, or satisfaction to the organization or funders, or 
verbal complaints to the servicers or representatives of the organiza­
tion. Baker considers direct and indirect methods of user influence, 
where direct influence refers to user-servicer interaction and indirect 
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influence refers to user-funder interaction with user anticipation of 
influencing the servicers indirectly. Of course, the user may attempt 
direct influence, indirect influence or both simultaneously. 
Also included in Baker's overall model of behavior are factors 
such as previous experiences of funders and users and learning by 
servicers. The over-all model is presented in Figure 2. 
Ruefli's Generalized Goal Decomposition 
Model of Decision Making 
Ruefli [91,89] has developed a generalized goal decomposition 
model which can be interpreted as a representation of decision making in 
a three-level hierarchical organization. It appears that the interac­
tion process between funders and servicers in the budgeting process of 
Baker's model is similar in nature to the resource allocation process in 
Ruefli's model. 
The hierarchical structure of the organization in Ruefli's process 
is shown in Figure 3. Depending upon the particular type of organiza­
tion, the top level management may be termed the central unit, funders, 
donor group, or superordinate and these terms will be used interchange­
ably. The second level is assumed to consist of K management units, 
each having an individual who may be called an administrator, a manager, 
a servicer, or a director. Only the interaction between the two top 
levels is considered in relating the superordinate-administrator inter­
action, but it can be easily generalized to many levels. 
In a manner analogous to the development of Baker's model, assume 
that administrator behavior is goal directed and that each goal is 
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where: ( ) is read "as perceived by." 
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Figure 3. Ruefli's Model of a Hierarchical Organization 
measurable. Let g^ be an (m^xl) vector of goal levels prescribed for 
administrator k by the superordinate. A component of g, , say g., , may 
indicate the requirement level or output that top management desires 
from unit k or it may indicate the amount of resource j available for 
input to unit k. For example, g ^ may represent the profit desired from 
unit k, g ^ may represent the proposed budget, and may be a limit on 
the manpower available to unit k. Thus, instead of a single resource 
model, a multiple resource—multiple requirement model can be attained. 
In addition, it is assumed that a project i of unit k can be described 
by an (m^xl) vector of attribute levels, P^s where each attribute is 
directly related to a goal. Given n^ projects or policies to implement, 
the administrator would attempt to determine which ones to select and at 
what level they would be implemented. Let x ^ be the activity level (as 
a fraction of the proposed level) of the ith project of management unit 
k, that is, is allowed to vary between zero and one. At x ^ equal 
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to one, project i of unit k would be fully implemented and its contribu­
tion toward the goals could be described by the vector Ruefli as­
sumes a linear model and thus the contribution of project i of unit k 
toward the goals is simply P ^ 5 ^ * 
Given a set of goals or goal vector and a set of projects, each 
administrator would seek to determine the activity level for each 
project so that 
nk 
E 2ikXik = Sk a n d ° ~ Xik " 1 f o r i=1.2,...,nk (3-6) i=l 
However, allowing for the possibility of not being able to exactly at­
tain the goals, Ruefli describes the problem of the kth management unit 
as: 
min (w£dk+w~d~) (3-7) 
nk 
subject to I P i k x i k - Id* + Id" = g R (3-8) 
i=l 
0 < x i k < 1 for i=l,2,...,nk (3-9) 
d k > 0 and d~ > 0 (3-10) 
where d k and d k are (mk*l) column vectors of positive and negative devi­
ations (respectively) from the goals; w* and w~ are (lxmk) row vectors 
of weights associated with positive and negative deviations; and I is 
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the identity matrix of appropriate dimension. The objective is to mini­
mize the weighted sum of deviations from the goals. 
The problem for the kth management unit is one in which the 
administrator attempts to attain the specified goal levels by determin­
ing the activity levels of the possible projects within the unit. It is 
assumed that priorities can be attached not only to the specific goals, 
but also to the deviations from the goal level. 
The actual goal levels attained in management k's unit would be 
I Eik xik = Ik + l % - ( 3 - n ) 
1 
Of course, for any particular goal, say j, it is easily seen that dt, 
and d_.̂  should not both be positive at the same time. The simplex pro­
cedure, which is used to solve the problem, incorporates this condition. 
Also, since they are required to be greater than or equal to zero, it 
follows that dt, dT, = 0 . If the actual goal level attained is equal to ]k ]k 
g. , then both dt, and dT, equal zero, jk jk jk 
It should be mentioned that the weights attached to the deviations 
need not be positive. For example, if a specific profit level is de­
sired and any profit generated from the kth unit that is above the 
specified level is considered as desirable, the weight attached to the 
positive profit deviation could be negative. Then, in a minimization 
problem, it would be desirable to increase profits above the specified 
level since the negative weight would decrease the value of the objec­
tive function. 
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Ruefli proposes the use of the simplex algorithm to solve the 
problem of the kth management unit. Associated with the optimal solu­
tion to the problem for the kth unit is a (lxm^) vector of simplex mul­
tipliers it, . The simplex multipliers or shadow prices can be inter-
—K 
preted as the change in the value of the kth unit's objective function 
per unit change in the right-hand side values. Thus, the jt/z component 
of t t ^ , is the change in the objective function per unit change in the 
jth goal level. 
Ruefli writes the problem of the central unit as: 
K 
k=l ~ k~ k 
.ubject to I P R g k > G (3-13) 
k 
g k > 0 for k=l,2,...,K (3-14) 
where G q is a (q*l) vector of stipulations or minimum acceptable levels 
and the P, are (qxm, ) matrices which transform the unit goals into ap-
propriate central unit goals. 
Referring to duality theory (Dantzig, 1963), it can be stated 
that, at optimality, the objective function of the kth unit's problem, 
min(w kd k+w kd k), is equal to max ^g^* Given that the central unit re­
ceives information regarding the optimal dual multipliers from each 
unit, the central unit is attempting to decrease the value of the sum 
of the objective functions of the units by changing their goals subject 
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to the restriction of satisfying the central unit's goals. 
In comparison to Baker's model, g^ may be seen to represent not 
only budget constraints but a number of other constraints in addition to 
specifying the desired outputs from unit k. The general objective 
function of the servicers is replaced by a specific objective function 
of minimizing the sum of weighted deviations from the goals. The range 
for the budget in Baker's model can be handled in the following way. 
Assume that the budget for the kth unit can range from g 2 k - b to 
^2k + a ' w ^ e r e a a n c^ k a r e positive• Since any budget in the range may 
be considered acceptable and outside the range as unacceptable, the por­
tion of the problem relating to the budget can be stated mathematically 
as follows: 
min (Mz ++My +) (3-15) 
subject to I p 2 i k x . k - d ^ + d" k = g 2 k (3-16) 
d 2 k - z + + z~ = a (3-17) 
d 2 k - y + + y = b (3-18) 
d2k' d2k' y + ' y » z + > z " - 0 (3-19) 
where M is a large positive weight. Thus, if the positive deviation, 
+ + d 2 k, is greater than a, then z would need to be greater than zero and 
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the objective function's value would be large. If the positive devia­
tion is greater than zero and less than a, then z would be greater than 
zero, z + would be zero, and the value of the objective function would be 
zero since the weights associated with d*^ and z are zero. The same 
reasoning holds for d , , y + and y . .A solution would be considered 
acceptable only if the solution to the above problem were zero. 
However,the above description of the problem and Baker's problem 
are different in the sense that Ruefli's model provides guidelines 
(goals) for overall unit activity, whereas Baker allows specific re­
strictions on projects. The specific restrictions can be handled in 
the Ruefli model by having the central unit specify the range for the 
activity level of a particular project. For example, if project i, at 
full implementation, would require a budget of $10,000 and the funders 
indicate an acceptable range between $2,500 and $7,500, then the activi­
ty vector x ^ would be restricted to the range .25 to .75. 
If, in addition to representing the central unit's goals, G q in­
cluded minimum levels associated with client satisfaction as perceived 
by the central unit, the generalized goal decomposition model may be 
interpreted in light of Baker's more general model. Besides requiring 
minimum satisfaction levels, Ruefli suggests that the central unit or 
funders also seek to minimize the sum of weighted goal discrepancies. 
However, there is no allowance for influence of a client directly upon 
the management unit as suggested by Baker in Figure 2, but not included 
in his analytical model, and described by Goodwin. 
Ruefli proposes the following iterative procedure in solving his 
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problem. Initially, the central unit specifies g^, k=l,2,...,K such 
that constraints (3-13) and (3-14) are satisfied. These goals are given 
to the respective managers who solve their problem using the simplex 
method. The administrators then indicate to the central unit the amount 
that the value of their objective functions would change per unit change 
in the goals, that is, they pass up the ^^'s* k=l,2,...,K. The central 
2 unit then solves its problem and sends down a new set of goals, g , 
—K 
k=l,2,...,K, to the respective administrators. This process continues 
until the deviations from the management unit goals are at a minimum and 
no readjustment of goal levels on the part of the central unit will 
•yield a net decrease in the deviations from the goal levels of the or­
ganization as a whole. Ruefli refers to proofs by Dantzig [33] and 
Dantzig, Orden and Wolfe [34] to show that the process will terminate in 
a finite number of steps. 
One of the problems of Ruefli's solution procedure is that the 
administrators may have to take some convex combination of all the goal 
levels sent to them by the central unit, that is, if r sets of goals 
have been sent to the management unit, the final solution may require 
that the selected operating goal levels be equal to ^ g v, Z4.» where 
—k t 
r t=l 
I z = 1 and z > 0 for t=l,2,...,r. Feeland (1973) points out that 
t=l 
it is necessary, for overall optimality, that each management unit must 
take the same convex combination. Since each management unit solves its 
problem independently, there is nothing to force each management unit to 
take the same convex combination unless the central unit determines it 
or the management units act as a group. Thus, Ruefli's model does not 
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allow the subordinates to operate independently. 
The final decision and the decision of which goals will be 
assigned to each subordinate is made by the subordinates 
acting as a group. In light of this interpretation, Ruefli's 
procedure is unappealing because it destroys the subordi­
nates' independence [Freeland, p.152]. 
Freeland proposes a goal partitioning procedure based on the 
works of Benders [18] and Zangwill [110] which alleviates the diffi­
culties inherent in Ruefli's model. Freeland's negotiation model of 
a non-cooperative organization is discussed in a latter section of this 
chapter. 
Collomb's Goal-Interval Model of 
a Decentralized Organization 
Collomb [30] recognizes two classes of criteria which have been 
assumed by the management literature to direct the firm's behavior: 
profit maximizing and satisficing. Profit maximizing has been discussed 
earlier. Satisficing, proposed by Simon [96], emphasizes that an organ­
ization does not attempt an almost endless search for an optimum, but if 
an alternative meets or exceeds a set of minimally satisfactory cri­
teria and no need for improvement is felt, then the search process can 
be stopped. But Collomb notes: 
Even if it is true that the firm is not motivated enough to look 
for another solution, as soon as any satisfactory alternative 
has been found, the firm would nevertheless be able in many 
cases to recognize, within the set of satisfactory alternatives, 
a better one. Furthermore, the attainment of a result within 
the satisfactory interval is generally an incentive to change 
the interval itself for the following periods in the direction 
of a "better" result. And, over a number of periods this trend 
for improvement will influence the searching process itself, 
which will incorporate some idea of what an optimizing search 
would be even if it is not carried to the point of actually 
looking for the optimum [30, pp.12-13]. 
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Another consideration when there exists multiple objectives is to 
find a set of efficient points or efficient operating strategies [76]. 
Given two objectives maximize f^(x) and maximize f 2(x) where x is a 
vector specifying an operating strategy and x is contained in a set S, 
then an efficient point x^ e S has the following property: 
There exist no x different from x^ and x e S such that f^(x) ^ 
f x(x 0) and f 2(x) > f 2(x Q). 
Given multiple objectives, an analyst would attempt to find the 
set of operating strategies X such that for any x. e X, the above 
property holds. Having the set of efficient points does not, however, 
aid a decision maker in specifying an operating strategy, but only 
eliminates the strategies that should not be considered. Therefore, it 
is still necessary to determine trade-offs and establish priorities be­
fore a specific operating strategy is selected. 
Collomb proposes that a mixture of an optimizing and satisficing 
model, which he terms a goal-interval-oriented model, is more appropri­
ate for describing a firm's behavior. Extending a goal programming 
formulation [26], Collomb suggests that for each performance variable 
x^, there be a series of target values g^. And that the value of an 
objective function would depend upon the position of x^ among the g^ 
and possibly some deviations x^ - g? for certain values of j. In gen­
eral, the problem becomes: 
min h(x?+,x?~) (3-20) i i 
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subject to x. . - x? + 
1 1 
+ x I' = g^, j=l,...,J.; i=l,...,n (3-21) 
f k(x x,x 2,...,x n) > 0, k=l,2,...,K (3-22) 
> 0 (3-23) 
Of course, for a meaningful solution, no two variables x^ , x^ , can 
be simultaneously non-zero. If it is assumed that h is pseudo-convex 
and that the constraints (3-22) form a convex set, then the problem is a 
convex programming problem. In his work, Collomb uses this "goal-
interval-oriented" model to formulate a firm's behavior. 
Noting the increasing trend toward decentralization in large 
firms, Collomb characterizes a decentralized organization in the follow­
ing way: (1) operating decisions are made by the management of the 
decentralized unit without, in principle, interference of the senior man­
agement; (2) the management of the decentralized units work toward one 
or more goals assigned to him and is judged or rewarded according to the 
results measured against the objectives; (3) the central management 
restricts itself to planning the objectives of the whole firm and de­
fining rules and setting objectives for the decentralized units; and 
(4) the central management does not have detailed information on the 
operations and constraints of each decentralized unit. Thus, in develop­
ing models of decentralized organizations, it is important to specify 
the information known at each level and the information flows. 
Noting the use of transfer prices in decentralized firms, Collomb 
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presents a review of and the difficulties associated with models of 
decentralization through prices. The review includes models by 
Koopmans [65], Charnes and Cooper [25], and Arrow and Hurwicz [6]. 
Turning to decentralized models, which make use of goals and 
objectives as well as prices, Collomb reviews the works of Charnes, 
Clower, and Kortanek's [26] pre-emptive goal formulation, Kornai and 
Liptak's [67] goal-allocation national planning model, and Ruefli's 
[91] three-level generalized goal decentralization model. With respect 
to Ruefli's model, described in the previous section, Collomb comments, 
"that a progressive organization in a competitive context, as a business 
firm usually is, could not be satisfied with minimizing internal ten­
sions under satisficing constraints, and a more general goal-programming 
formulation could be required" [30, p.121]. This leads to the notion 
that the central unit desires not only to minimize the sum of the 
weighted deviations from the subordinates goals but also to attempt to 
achieve some specific goals of its own. 
Using a linear model for convenience, Collomb develops a goal 
interval model which has the following assumptions: 
1. goal interval oriented behavior is assumed at every level 
2. the central unit has to satisfy some global constraints 
3. the central unit has a goal vector which describes the 
overall goals of the firm 
4. each management unit is assigned a goal vector by the 
central management 
5. the objective function of the central unit is the mini­
mization of the deviation of the actual performance of 
management units from the overall goals 
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6. the weights given to each assigned goal by the decentralized 
units are likely to be dependent upon both explicit prefer­
ences and policies of the central unit and subjective biases 
of the unit management, however weight changes are not 
considered in the model 
7. the decentralized unit operates within a framework of 
assigned goals and technical constraints 
8. if assigned goals are outside a certain "interval of attain­
ability", their incentive power (i.e. weight in the objective 
function) is reduced. 
Before stating Collomb's goal-interval model, the following ad­
ditional definitions are needed: 
Let s + and s = ( q x D column vectors of positive and negative devia­
tions of actual performance from G Q . 
u + and u = (l xq) row vectors of positive and negative weights 
for the central unit. 
The central unit's problem can be stated as: 
min (u +s ++u~s~) (3-24) 
subject to T P, (g, +d*-d') - s + + s~ = G (3-25) 
, K —K —K —K — — —O k 
I k> s£> d k , s +, s > 0 (3-26) 
where G ^ has become the desired goal levels of the central unit, rather 
than the minimum levels. The other variables in the central unit's 
problem were defined in the statement of Ruefli's problem. The problem 
for unit k is stated as: 
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min (w£d£+w kd k) (3-27) 
subject to I P i k * i k - d k + d~ = g k (3-28) 
i 
d k, d~ > 0 (3-29) 
x.. > 0 for all i (3-30) ik 
Collomb also allows the possibility of an equation which couples the 
variables of different units: 
I I c i k x i k - H - ( 3 - 3 1 ) 
i k 
A "discouragement zone," where the incentive power is reduced if 
the actual performance is outside the range of full impact of the goal, 
is also taken into account. The model for the management unit is modi­
fied as: 
+ + + + _ _ _ _ min £ w k ( d k ~ a k z k ) + w^Cd^-a^z^)] (3-32) 
subject to I P i k * i k " 5 K + d k = g k (3-33) 
i 
I Eik x ik - 2k + * = <9k*fr ( 3 " 3 I t ) 
1 
I Eik x ik + 5k " ^ = «Sk-^> < 3 " 3 5 ) 
1 
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d £ , d~, z+, z k, A, A' > 0 (3-36) 
x., > 0 for all i (3-37) lk 
where 
a* and a^ are given coefficients (between zero and one characterizing 
the intensity of the discouragement when actual performance 
is situated outside the range of full impact of the goal. 
(g^+b*) is the upper limit of the impact range. 
(g^-b^) is the lower limit of the impact range. 
is an (m^xl) vector of positive deviations above the upper 
limit of the impact range. 
z~ is an (m^xl) vector of negative deviations below the lower 
limit of the impact range. 
A is an (m^xi) vector of negative deviations below the upper 
limit. 
A' is an (m^xl) vector vector of positive deviations above the 
lower limit. 
Noting that the modified form does not introduce any mathematical 
difficulty, but only increases the complexity of the notation, Collomb 
does not use the modified form in his statement of the overall problem 
facing the firm. 
Collomb writes the overall problem as follows: 
min (u +s ++u"s~) (3-24) 
subject to I P, (g, -d*+d~) - s + + s~ = G (3-25) 
, K —K —K —K — — —O k 
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I I c i x x i k 2 H ( 3 - 3 1 ) 
1 k 
E £ i k x i k " dk + -k = ik' k = 1> 2>---> K (3-28) i 
H k P i k * 0, i=l,2,...,nk (3-38) 
-TTK < w* (3-39) 
7RK < w~ (3-40) 
+ ?k dk " Ik«k ( 3 " 4 1 ) 
d*, d k > 0 (3-29) 
s +, s~ > 0 (3-42) 
g k * 0 (3-43) 
x., > 0 (3-30) ik 
Recognizing that the only non-linear terms present are the TT g, ,• 
— K—K 
Collomb proposes an algorithm by Soland (1970) for the solution of 
separable non-convex programming problems to solve this problem. 
One might note that constraints (3-38), (3-39), and (3-40) are 
the dual constraints to the management unit's problem and constraint 
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(3-41) requires that the solution to the primal problem of unit k be 
less than or equal to the dual problem. However, duality theory re­
quires that a solution to the primal problem, a minimization problem, 
be greater than or equal to the solution to the dual problem, a maximi­
zation problem. Thus constraint (3-41) requires an optimal solution, 
with the equality holding for each management unit problem. Using the 
above argument, Freeland (1973) proves that Collomb is assuming that the 
overall objective function is to minimize the sum of the weighted 
discrepancies from the central unit's goals plus the sum of the weighted 
discrepancies from the management units' goals. Collomb's overall prob­
lem might be revised by eliminating constraints (3-38), (3-39), (3-40), 
and (3-41) and replacing the object ive function by 
min [u +s ++u~s~ + J (w^d^+w'd")]. (3-44) 
k 
One of the drawbacks associated with the solution procedure pro­
posed by Collomb is that all information about the various elements of 
the problem is required and a centralized solution procedure is used. 
The problem was originally presented in a decomposed form; however, by 
rewriting it in an overall form for solution, all of the information is 
required. Thus the method of solution is not feasible in an operational 
sense, in that it does not mirror the solution procedure in an organiza­
tion. However, the model may be used to simulate the effect of changes 
in organizational parameters and for a centralized review of the organi­
zation. 
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Freeland's Negotiation Model of 
a Non-Cooperative Organization 
With the belief that "conceptual models of organizational 
processes can provide insights and knowledge about how the flow of in­
formation and the organizational structure can affect decision making" 
[45, p.l], Freeland presents and analyzes mathematical models of re­
source allocation decision making in a hierarchical decentralized organi­
zation. Freeland views the organization as a goal-seeking system con­
sisting of goal-seeking subsystems in which "it is assumed that the 
decision making process at a specific point in the organization can be 
modelled as the solution of a mathematical programming problem" [45, 
p.6], The constraints of the programming problem are seen to represent 
perceived technological and other restrictions imposed on the decision. 
Freeland defines a cooperative organization as one in which there 
may exist conflict among decision making units at a given level of the 
hierarchy over limited resources available; however, there does not 
exist conflict between levels over objectives. In a non-cooperative 
organization, there also exists conflict between levels over objectives. 
Looking at coordination mechanisms, which are "devices by which 
the superordinate can influence the subordinate to seek a resource allo­
cation program that furthers the objectives of the superordinate" [45, 
p.13], Freeland considers two classes: (1) goal intervention mechanisms 
and (2) constraint intervention mechanisms. Goal intervention refers to 
a superordinate's influence over the objective function of the subordi­
nate. Freeland reviews the goal intervention models, often called 
pricing approaches, of Koopmans [65] and Arrow and Hurwicz [6] and the 
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decomposition algorithms of Dantzig-Wolfe [35,36], Balas [9], Whinston 
[107], Hass [56], Jennergren [60], Lasdon and Schoeffler [70], Uzawa 
[105], and Lasdon [69]. Constraint intervention refers to a superordi­
nate 's control over the feasible decision region of the subordinate. 
Freeland reviews constraint intervention models, often called resource 
budgeting approaches. The economic and behavioral interpretations and 
implications for the three basic strategies (1) tangential approxima­
tion, (2) large step subgradient, and (3) piecewise approaches, which 
have been suggested by Geoffrion [46], along with a number of algorithms 
utilizing these approaches in their solution procedure are discussed. 
Other approaches examined are those of Kornai and Liptak [67] and 
Weitzman [106]. 
Two specific characteristics of coordination mechanisms are abso­
lute coordination, which "refers to acts which influence the subordi­
nates so that they find a resource allocation program which is optimal 
with respect to the superordinate's objective function" [45, p.14], and 
relative coordination, which refers to "acts which influence subordi­
nates to find a solution which is 'satisfactory' but not necessarily 
optimal with respect to the objectives of the superordinate" [45, p.14]. 
Freeland shows that in the decomposition models to date, except 
for Ruefli's and Collomb's models, that the structure of the organiza­
tion has no effect on the final solution, that the subordinates have no 
autonomy or influence on thefinal decision, and that relative coordina­
tion has no meaning in a cooperative organization. 
Freeland introduces a third coordination mechanism, a negotiation 
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mechanism called a goal partitioning procedure, for a non-cooperative 
organization in which the resource allocation does depend on the organi­
zation's structure and the final decision is influenced by the objec­
tives of the superordinate and subordinates. The goal partitioning 
algorithm is based on Bender's partitioning procedure [18]. 
Freeland rewrites Ruefli's model as an overall problem: 
min I (w*d*+w d~) (3-45) 
, - K — K —K—K 
k 
subject to I P g > G (3-46) 
, K—K —O k 
I P i kx. k - Id* + Id^ - g k = 0 for k=l,2,...,K (3-47) 
i 
x i k < 1 for i=l,...,nk (3-48) 
k=l,...,K 
x. k > 0, d k, d~ > 0. (3-49) 
The model is then expanded to include goals that the subordinate 
establishes for himself and technological constraints and other restric­
tions that must be satisfied. Thus a bit more "realism" is introduced 
into the model by recognizing that the subordinates may desire to 
achieve objectives which differ from the goals specified by the super­
ordinate. 
Since the goal partitioning procedure is used as a solution pro­
cedure in the organizational system model, the details are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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In this chapter, the welfare system provided an illustration of 
the organizational system model. The analytical model of a service 
organization illustrated a general analytical description of the deci­
sion problem facing the major participants in an organizational system. 
Ruefli's goal decomposition model is a specialization of Baker's general 
model. In the goal decomposition model, the funder is seen as attempt­
ing to minimize the overall internal tension of the organization by 
establishing goal guidelines for the administrators in addition to 
exceeding a threshold level for organizational requirements and allo­
cating organizational resources which do not exceed their availability. 
Collomb extended the work of Ruefli by (1) allowing the central unit to 
have specific goal levels, instead of threshold levels, (2) allowing 
regions for satisfactory goal attainment and (3) providing for a dis­
couragement zone when actual performance is outside the range of full 
impact of the goal. The goal partitioning solution procedure suggested 
by Freeland appears to present a more realistic description'in a be­
havioral sense, of the resource allocation process in a hierarchical de­
centralized organization. However, Freeland's model does not explicitly 
include client interaction with the funder or administrator. In the 
next chapter, the goal partitioning procedure is described in light of 
client intervention. Thus the model will be expanded to reflect the 
interactions described in the models of Baker and Goodwin. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION SYSTEM MODELS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, several organizational decision system models of 
resource allocation in a hierarchical organization are proposed. First, 
a model, based upon Freeland's goal-partitioning procedure and Baker's 
analytical model of the resource allocation process in a service organi­
zation is developed along with a description of a solution procedure. 
In this model, the satisfaction of a client is reflected in the funder's 
perception of minimum satisfaction level of the client as described in 
Baker's model. 
Next, two organizational system models, in which client feedback 
is explicitly included in the goal setting, planning, and resource allo­
cation process, are proposed when the client is allowed to purchase por­
tions of the organization's output. The first model describes one way 
in which the central unit could use client feedback to establish client-
oriented goals for the management unit when deviations from the client-
oriented goals are allowed. The second model considers the situation 
in which the management unit is not allowed to deviate from the client-
oriented goals. 
Consideration is given for allowing projects to be redesigned 
subject to technological constraints. 
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If the organization's output is such that the client is in a 
buy-no buy situation, then the types of information flow needed and the 
use of this information for producing output more acceptable to the 
client are discussed along with an information flow model. 
A Goal Partitioning Procedure 
(Implicit Consideration of a Client) 
Consider the two-level hierarchical organization, in which the 
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Figure 4. Two-Level Hierarchical Organization 
with Client Interaction 
The superordinate, top management, or funder are considered as 
the central unit and have control over the allocation of resources and 
establishment of overall objectives. Assume that the central unit has 
established the organization's resource levels and organizational per­
formance requirements and these levels can be described by a vector G^ 
with dimension (q*l). For example, the first s components of G may 
specify the levels of organizational resources available and the last 
(q-s) components may specify the minimum organizational performance 
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requirements established by the central unit. In addition, assume that 
the central unit has some perception of the client's desires and is able 
to describe the organization's output in terms of a vector of output 
attributes and that the minimum attribute levels can be described by the 
vector G c with dimension (rxl). Although the components of could be 
considered as performance requirements specified by the central unit and 
thus be incorporated in G^, it is desirable to keep G^ and Ĝ . distinct 
in order to develop a frame of reference for the models developed in 
this chapter. 
The central unit's desire is to attempt to allocate organization­
al resources and organizational performance requirements and to deter­
mine the contribution to the organization's output for each management 
unit such that 
1. the resources used by the management units do not 
exceed the supply. 
2. the performance of the management units which con­
tribute toward the organizational performance require­
ments at least satisfy the minimum organizational per­
formance requirements. 
3. the organizational output, which consists of the con­
tributions of each management unit at least achieves 
the minimum attribute levels. 
Let g^ be an (f*l) vector of central unit oriented goals for 
—K 
management unit k which consists of both resources performance require­
ments for management unit k, k=l,2,...,K. is defined as a (qxf) 
matrix which relates g^ to by P^g^- The rows of P^ specify the 
linear combination of the components of g^ which utilize an organiza­
tional resource or contribute toward an organizational performance 
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requirements. For example, if the first component of referred to the 
total organizational budget and the first three components of g^ 
referred to budgets available to management unit k for manpower, capital 
equipment, and raw resources, then the first row of would consist of 
three l's followed by (f-3) zero's. Considering resources as being 
negative in value and performance requirements positive in value and, 
for simplicity, assume that the consumption of organizational resources 
r f 
and achievement of organizational performance requirements is l P^g^s 
f k then the central unit attempts to determine g for k=l,2,...,k such that 
- K I ?d 2 G-r 
k 
In a like manner, let g^ be a (c*l) vector of client-oriented 
objectives determined by the central unit for each management unit k, 
k=l,2,...,K and M be an (r*c) transformation matrix relating g, to 
K —K 
G . The central unit, in seeking to satisfy the client, would want to 
c c c v c specify client-oriented objectives (g^jgg*•••»g^) such that i ̂ g ^ -
k 
G . (It may be the case that P^ and/or are identity matrices). As 
f c with G and G , the g and g are treated separately to develop a frame —r —c —k — K 
of reference for models developed in the main part of this chapter. 
Given a vector of goals related to the central unit's objectives 
and to the client's objectives, administrator k is assumed to have the 
decision problem of determining the activity level x ^ for each project 
i, i=l,2,...,nk, under his control. The activity level x^. is a vari­
able between zero and one, i.e. 0 < x ^ < 1, for all i and k. A project 
is considered to be the smallest unit or task under the control of the 
administrator. It is assumed that each project can be described by a 
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vector of project attributes P^* dimension ((f+ak+c+&k)xl] , where the 
subscript ik denotes the ith project of the kth unit. 
In addition to central unit objectives and client objectives 
c • . 
g, for each unit k=l,2,...,K, it is desirable to denote two other goal 
vectors, which have been proposed by Freeland [44]. Let g^, an (a^xl) 
vector, be used to describe the goal levels desired by administrator k. 
These goals may consist of personal objectives of the administrator and 
objectives which are internal to the unit and do not concern top manage­
ment. It is important to recognize these goals, since there may exist 
instances in which a subordinate may make decisions based, not upon 
satisfying organizational objectives, but rather upon achieving personal 
objectives of the administrator k or upon achieving objectives which are 
unique to management unit k. The last set of goal levels g^, an (Z^xi) 
vector, refer to requirement levels based on exogenous factors, such as 
legal constraints or technological constraints. It is assumed that the 
requirement levels, based on exogenous factors, must be attained, where­
as g^ refer to desirable goal levels for management unit k. 
Given that management unit k has goals oriented toward the cen-
f c £ a tral unit g^, the client g^, exogenous factor g^, and itself g^, it is 
desirable to partition the vector of project attributes p ^ . Thus, let 
f a c H p.,, p.,, p.,, and p., designate a project i's contribution toward the 
— I K —lK — l K —IK 
central unit's goals, management unit's personal goals, client-oriented 
goals, and exogenous goals, respectively. 
In relating a project's contribution toward a management unit's 
goals, the following assumptions are made: 
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1. Project i's contribution toward the management unit's 
goals is a function of the activity level of that 
project. 
2. Total contribution toward a management unit's goals 
is the sum of individual project contributions. 
Assume that the goals levels for personal management unit goals 
a Z 
and exogenous goals are fixed at g^ and g^, respectively, for k=l,2,..., 
f ft c ct K. Given that the central unit fixes g^ = g^ and g^ = g^ for each 
r ft v ct management unit such that l P, g, ^ G and l M, g, £ G , then, since it 
k K—K -1" k K—K ~ C 
is usually assumed that the goals of a management unit should be met, 
the following vectors equations can be used to relate the projects, 
activity levels, and management unit's goals for management unit k: 
I E i k ( x i k ) = *k 
1 
I Eik^ik' = Sk 
1 
I £ik ( Xik } = ik 1 
I Pik ( xik } - Sk 
1 
The last vector row is in the form of an inequality in order to denote 
I acceptability only for values less than or equal g, . 
- K 
It is more often than not the case that the goals are either not 
+ + + attained or exceeded. To allow for this variation, let d,., d , d be -f -a' -c 
column vectors which indicate the amounts by which the respective goals 
are surpassed, that is, positive deviations, and d , d , d~ be column 
— r _ a — c 
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vectors which indicate the amounts by which the goals were not attained, 
that is, negative deviations. The above equations would then become: 
J p. (x.. ) - d* + d_ = gV~ k -ifk ik -fk -fk -k 1 
I Biak ( xik ) " £ k + 52k = §k 
1 
I Pick ( xik ) - 5ck+ 5;k = s? 
i 
I Eiik ( xik ) £ Ik 
1 
where d*^, d ^ > 0 , d*^» d ^ 0 , d^, d ^ > 0 , and of course only the 
negative or positive component would be greater than zero. This last 
requirement is satisfied when using the simplex solution procedure. 
In establishing an objective function for the administrator, the 
goal programming formulation is used. Since goals are usually set to 
be attained, it may be reasonable to assume that the administrator has 
the objective of meeting all of the goals of his unit. If this were the 
case, then a mathematical formulation of his objective function could be 
of the form: 
minimize (ld^+ld^+ld^+ld ^+ld^+ld ^) 
where 1 is a row vector (of appropriate dimension) of one's and the 
objective would be to minimize the sum of all positive and negative 
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deviations by selecting the appropriate values for the activity levels. 
If it is assumed that the measurement unit for the goals are 
expressed in a common dimension, then the above objective implies that 
an equal priority is attached to each deviation from a goal. However, 
the priority of a goal is usually established either explicitly or im­
plicitly and there may exist a different amount of value attached to 
being below a specified goal level as opposed to exceeding that level. 
For example, an administrator may consider it to be highly important 
not to exceed a given budget level; however, he may also consider it to 
be fairly important not to spend an amount of money which is a great deal 
less than the budgeted level. If the latter case occurred, the admin­
istrator might find his budget cut during the next budgeting cycle and 
this is usually considered as an undesirable consequence. 
In order to take into account the different priorities for posi­
tive and negative deviations and also the relative importance of these 
deviations with respect to deviations from other goals, let , w+, , 
—rK — aK 
+ — — — . . . 
w ^ and w c ^ be vectors of priorities associated with positive 
and negative goal deviations, respectively. The objective function for 
administrator k can then be written as: 
The decision problem to be solved by administrator k is to deter­
mine the activity levels x ^ for each of the n^ projects under his con­
trol with the objective of minimizing the sum of weighted deviations 
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from the established goal levels subject to the exogenous and technical 
constraints. The values of the weights are assumed to be determined by 
the administrator; however, the superordinate may exert some degree of 
influence in the selection of the values. As mentioned previously, the 
activity variables may vary from zero to one, where zero indicates that 
the project is rejected; one indicates that the project is fully imple­
mented; and x^^ is strictly between zero and one indicates implementa­
tion at a partial level. 
Assume, for convenience, that the project contributions are a 
linear function of activity level, that is, there are constant returns 
to scale, so that £ Pik^xik^ = \ -ikxik* Given "the fixed goal levels 
ft ct i _ 1 1 i - 1 
g and g, from the central unit, management unit k's problem can now 
— K —K 
be formulated as a linear goal programming problem: 
Problem A^ -— k— 
, ft Ctv / + ,+ — j — + , + - + , + — - — \ / | -I \ m m z. (g. ,g, ) = (w,., d-, +w_, d £ 1 +w . d . +w , d . +w . d + w . d . ) (4-1) k -k, -k -fk-fk -fk-fk -ak-ak -ak-ak -ck-dk -ck-ck 
subject to I p! kx. k - Id^ + If - gp (U-2) 
1 
I - + IdLc = Sk ( 4 - 3 ) 
l 
i Eikxik - i dck + id.;k = i f 
l ExVik £ Ik ("" 5 ) 
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x i k > 0 for i=l,2,...,nk (4-6) 
where I is the identity matrix of appropriate dimension and x^ k < 1 is 
included in constraint (4-5) without loss of generality. The optimal 
value of the objective function of Problem A k will be denoted 
ft ct t ^(g^ »gj< ) a n (i the optimal solution *£k» i=l»2,...,nk« 
Problem A, is similar to Freelandfs formulation with the addition k 
of client-related goals and variables. Since the decision problem for 
management unit k is formulated as a linear programming problem, it can 
be solved by the simplex algorithm. 
At this point it may be appropriate to recall that it is assumed 
that the goals of the administrator are commensorate, in that all goals 
may be transformed to a common dimension. However, Lee [73] strongly 
opposes such a transformation to a single criterion. He states: 
Often, multiple goals of management are in conflict or are 
achievable only at the expense of other goals. Furthermore, 
these goals are incommensurable. Thus, the solution of the 
problem requires an establishment of a hierarchy of importance 
among these incompatable goals so that the low-order goals are 
considered only after the higher-order goals are satisfied or 
have reached the point beyond which no further improvements 
are desired [73, p.21]. 
Lee suggests that the negative and/or positive deviations about 
a goal must be ranked according to preemptive priority factors. Pre­
emptive priority factors (non-Archimedian weights) have the relationship 
of W. >>> W. n, which implies that the multiplication of W. n by n, no 3 3+1' r v ]+l J ' 
matter how large n may be, cannot make it larger than W_.. Lee proposes 
the use of a modified simplex algorithm which assures that high priority 
deviations are minimized before lower priority deviations are minimized. 
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This is accomplished by expanding the relative cost coefficient row in 
the simplex tableau to a matrix in which there is a row for each priori­
ty level. If deviational variables are commensurable, then they would 
have the same priority factor with possibly different coefficients to 
indicate the relative amount of unsatisfactory deviation from the goals. 
However, little is known about the dual problem and the meaning of the 
dual variables (which play an important part in the formulations and 
solution procedures suggested by Rueffli, Collomb and Freeland) when 
preemptive priority factors are used in the primal problem. Therefore, 
the discussion is continued assuming that the goals are commensurable. 
In considering the objective function of administrator k, Collomb 
[30] has referred to it as a measure of internal tension and Freeland 
* ft ct 
calls it discrepancy dissatisfaction. If ^(g^ >gk ) is "the optimal 
value of Problem when central unit and client goals are g ^ and gk^» 
respectively, then z^( ) could be considered as a measure of internal 
tension or discrepancy dissatisfaction. If, as Georgopoulos and Tan-
nenbaum [48] suggest, one of the measures of effectiveness of an organi­
zation is the absence of strain or tension, then one of the objectives 
of the central unit might be to reduce the total amount of tension or 
dissatisfaction in the organization while attempting to insure that 
overall central unit objectives and client objectives are attained. 
ft ct 
Thus the central unit would attempt to select (g^ ,g^ ), for k=l,2,..., r ft r ct K such that ) PL,gu - G,. and I M, g, ^ G and in addition minimize 
k K—K — I" k K K —C 
v ft C t 




Following the work of Freeland (1973), the overall problem for 
the organization can be written as: 
Problem 0 
min 7 z, (g, ,g, ) = y w C T d„ +W-, d_ +w . d . +w . d . +w . d . +w ,d , ) (4-7) f k -k-k f -fk fk -fk-fk -ak-ak -ak-ak -ck-ck -ck-ck k k + ,+ 
subject to £ P-vx 
I ?ikXik 
Id* + Id" - Igf = 0 h ̂ ik ik -fk -fk =k l 
ik~ik I-ak + I dak " §ak 




J pkik * ?f (4-9) 
I Mklk 25 §c (4-10) 
dkgd-~fk * °> dak> dak * °> dck' dck * -°> Xik * ° f ° r a 1 1 £> k ( 4 " 1 1 } 
One might note the similarity between Problem 0 and Baker's Single 
Resource-Fully Constrained Model, where G^ and G__ are analogous to the 
minimum level of satisfaction, 3"̂ , of the funder evaluation function and 
the minimal level of user satisfaction, 3 U, as perceived by the funder. 
Before applying Benders' Partitioning Procedure [18] to the 
organization's problem, the following change in notation will aid in 











, f a c £. 
t - + - + - . 
-fk'-fk'-ak'-ak'-ck'-ck; 
for k=l,2,...,K and define the following matrices: 
F
k
 = c P i k ' e 2 k " - " £ n k k 
A
k
 = [ P t k ' 2 2 k ' * - " 2 n k k 
Ck = [ P i k ' P 2 k ' " - ' 2 n i k 
- I I 0 0 0 0] 
0 0 -1 1 0 0] 
0 0 0 0 -1 1] 
6U 
Lk = [ £ l k > 4 E n W 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
k 
f c 
and let the set of (g k,g k) be defined by 
S = { % ' S k > = l P k i k * § f I MkSk 2 9 C > 
Problem 0 can then be rewritten as 
Problem 0-1 




A k 0 







* -g ^k 
(4-13) 
Y k > 0 k=l,2,...,K (4-14) 
(4-15) 
f c 
For a fixed (g k >g k> 
ft ct 
(g k ,gk ) e S, the problem becomes 
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Problem 0 
m m (4-12) 
subject to 
-L, 






, k=l,2,...,K (4-16) 
Y k > 0, k=l,2,...,K (4-14) 
f c t However, with (g ,g, ) fixed, Problem 0 is separable into K problems 
— K —K 
Problem A, for each k=l,2,...,K 
/ ft ct, T T v m i n z
k < I k >I k > = ? kY k (4-17) 
subject to 















Let t t ^ = ( t t ^ , t t ^ , t t ^ , t t ) be a (lx(f+a k+c+£ k )J vector of dual vari-
t t ables for Problem A, . The dual of Problem A, can be written as 
K K 
Dual D^ —k— 
f j / ft ct, „ , , f ft a a c ct £ I „ , /, ««\ max{<J)(gk ,gk ): ̂ ê} = {yr̂  +*kgk+lkgk ~HkIk: Hk€ k} C+-20) 
where 
Problem 0 can then be written as: 
mm 
(Sk'8k)£Rl 




k Y, < -k C, k 





Ik * ° ] 
mm r r r f , a a c c f c f c r T l 
where 
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R = {(g k,g k)eS :3 a feasible Y k, k=l,2,...,K to Problem 0} 
f c 
^ i k » I k ^ c S : F o r e a c h Hke Uk' k=l,2,...,K, 
, f f a a c c % JU ^ 
" ^ W V ^ k - k ^ k S ^ * " } 
f c r k {(g ,g,)eS: For each extreme ray tt, of —k - K -k 
fr, ar cr, %v 
U k, k=l,2,...,K, (Tjk K g ^ + I T k gk+JJ K£-lk K g£) < 0} 
The Problem 0 can further be expressed as: 
Problem 0-2 
min I a (4-21) 
k k 
U - J . ^ ^ r f f a a c c & £ n ,, _ _ \ subject to a k > max tH kSk +\ik +-kik"-kik- 1 (4-22) 
V U k 
for k=l,2,...,K 
(ik'Ik } € R* ( 4 " 2 3 ) 
f c ft ct 
Note that for a particular (g^,g^) = (g k ,gk ), if there is an extreme 
ray irf with -k 
f*\ ar, cr, ^ iv, „ k ft , k a kct k £ „ 
-k sk -k sk -k -k -k ek ' 
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t Sk r k then the dual problem Dual D^ is unbounded for some t t ^ = + A t t ^ , 
(.'• 
,Jk t 
( A > 0 and it an extreme point of Dual D^). That is, Problem 0 has no 
f c ft ct feasible solution for (g, ,g, ) = ( 
§v »Su )• Hence the restriction 
f r k f a r k a C r k c Z r k I 
( " " u S u + 1 T u § u + 7 T v S v " " 7 ^ - ^ -*-s included in the definition of R . -k -k -k —k — K —k —k - k 







, Problem 0-2 can be expressed as 
Problem 0-3 
min £ a (4-21) 
subject to a k > Tjk g k, S k=l, 2,. .. ,E k > k=l,2,...,K (4-24) 
7ikKgk < 0, rk=l,2,...,Hk, k=l,2,...,K (4-25) 
I Pkik ^ G-f and J HkSk * 5 c -k 
(4-26) 
where S k denotes an extreme point of Dual D k of which there are E k and 
r k denotes an extreme ray of Dual D k of which there are H k« However, 
the rows of this problem can be generated as and when required. The solu­
tion procedure is given below. Proofs that the solution procedure given 
below is finite (that is, will terminate in a finite number of itera­
tions), and is optimal (that is, solves Problem 0) are given by Benders 
[18, p.245] and Lasdon [69, p.379], when the set S is closed and 
bounded. 
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The solution procedure for solving Problem 0 is as follows: 
f fl c cl Step 1. Select initial g^ = g^ and g^ = g^ for k=l,2,...,K, 
such that (4-26) is satisfied. Set initial = = -°° for k=l,2,..., 
K. There are no constraints of the forms (4-24) or (4-25) present. 
fl cl 
This initial step is performed by the central unit. The (g^ ,g^ ) for 
k=l,2,...,K is sent to the respective management unit. 
. f 1 c 
Sk 'Sk 
fl cl 
Step 2. Each management unit receives (g, ,g, ) from the 
central unit and solves Dual D?; to yield an optimal extreme point solu-
S kl S I r 1 
tion i t ^ or an unbounded solution (tt^ + A t t ^ ). This solution is 
sent to the central unit. 
Step 3. If there is an optimal extreme point solution for man­
agement unit k's problem, then it is greater than -°° (the value of a^) 
K 
and constraint (4-24) is violated. Therefore the constraint is added 
and the dual simplex can be used. (Note that this requires the central 
^k a £ 
unit to have information regarding the values of tt , g , and g . A 
—K —K —K 
method, proposed by Freeland (1973) is used to decrease the amount of 
information transferred and is discussed shortly.) If there is an un­
bounded solution for management unit k's problem, then it violates 
(4-25). In this case the constraint is added and the dual simplex can 
be used. 
Step 4. After adding constraints of the form (4-24) and/or 
2 f 2 c 2 
(4-25), Problem 0-3 is solved to attain and (g^ ,g^ ) for k=l,2,..., 
K. The new set of goals are sent to the respective management unit and 
replace the previous (gf\gf "*"). Management unit k solves Problem A^. 
- K -K k 
Again the extreme point solution or unbounded solution is sent to the 
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central unit. 
Step 5. At iteration T, if there is an unbounded solution, it 
violates constraint (4—25) and the constraint is introduced, and return 
to Step 4. 
At iteration T, if there is an extreme point solution 
and constraints of the form (4—24) are violated, introduce the con­
straints and return to Step 4. 
At iteration T, if there is an extreme point solution 
and constraints of the form (4-24) are not violated, then the solution 
is optimal for Problem 0. 
If constraints of the form (4-24) are required, Freeland [45] 
presents a method in which it is not necessary to transfer the values 
a S k 
of tt, to the central unit. However, if constraints of the form (4-25) 
—K 
are required, then it is necessary to transfer the values of tt to the 
—K 
central unit, which is undesirable from a behavioral standpoint, since 
the central unit has no control over administrator-oriented goals or 
technological factors. Extreme rays associated with constraint (4-25) 
need not be considered if the following assumption is made: 
Assumption 4-1. Assume that a feasible solution exists to Dual D^ and 
the constraint set is strictly bounded. Then the maximum value of 
Dual D£ occurs at an extreme point of the constraint set and no 
extreme rays would exist. 
Another way to alleviate constraint (4-25) of Problem 0-3 is by 
making the following assumptions: a feasible solution exists for 
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Problem and there is a finite lower bound on the objective function 
ft ct t ft ct z, (g ,g, ) for Problem A, for any choice of g, < 0 0, g, < 0 0. Then 
two duality theorems presented by Dantzig (1963) can be used. 
Theorem 4.1. If a feasible solution exists for the primal Problem 
A^ and z (gf^jgf*") has a finite lower bound, an optimal feasible solu-
tion exists. 
Theorem 4.2. If an optimal feasible solution exists for the primal 
Problem A^, there exists an optimal feasible solution to the dual, 
Dual D^. The proofs are given by Dantzig [33, p.135]. 
Therefore, if it can be assumed that a feasible solution exists 
for the primal Problem A^ and it has a finite lower bound, and since an 
optimal feasible solution to the dual Dual D^ occurs at an extreme 
point, there would not exist any extreme rays and constraints of form 
(4-25) do not need to be considered. 
Recognizing that there are a finite number of extreme points, 
Sk=l,2,...,Ek for Dual D^, k=l,2,...,K, Freeland [45] proposes the fol­
lowing approach in order to reduce the amount of information transfer 
required to solve Problem 0. 
ft ct . For any given values g^ < 0 0, g^ < 0 0, at optimality, duality 
theory (Dantzig, 1963) states that the value of the primal Problem A^ 
K 
f '': ft ct ^ t f " ft Ct 
[z k(g k ,g^ )J and the value of the dual Dual D^ [^(g^ >gk )J are equal. 
Therefore 
* ft ctx ft ft at a ct ct It I 
z
k % >Sk > = Hk i k + Hk i k + \ i k " I k i k ^ - 2 7 > 
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ft at ct &t where (tt, , t t , t t , t t ) denotes the optimal extreme point solution to 
—K — K — K — K 
Dual D^. If the management unit k solves Problem by using the sim-
" ft ct ft at ct &t plex algorithm, the values of z k ( g k > g k ) and ( t t ^ j T T ^ j T t ^ j T t ^ ) are 
"/ ft ct readily available. However, by sending only the values of z (g ,g ), 
K — K —K 
which may be considered as the amount of discrepancy dissatisfaction 
ft ct on interval tension, and (tt ,tt ) which provide an indication of how 
—K —K 
" ft C t 
z v ( g u ' g u ) would change per unit change of the goals, enough informa-
K — K — K 
tion is available for the central unit to form a constraint of the form 
(4-24). This is accomplished by using the following constraint: 
^ k, ft ct, ft ft ct ct ft f ct c f l l o n , 
°k " Z k ( g k ^ k } " ^k ik " \ ik + \ ik + *k ik ( 4 " 2 8 ) 
which, by direct substitution of (4-27) is equal to 
_ f t f x a t a x e t c It I ,. o n . 
°k " \ ik + \ ik + ^k ik " \ ik ( 4 " 2 9 ) 
Constraint (4-28) and (4-24) are equivalent and the substitution is 
a & 
appropriate since g^ and g^ are not variables from the point of view of 
the central unit. The only goal variables for the central unit are 
f c 
g, and g . Using Assumption 1, which alleviates extreme rays, and con-
—K —K 





min I (4-21) 
f S ] < CS fS k fS k =S k gS k cS k cS 
° k 2 \ ( § k 'ik > - 5 k s k - ; k s k - i k s k + i k § k c * - 2 8 > 
for Sk=l,2,...,Ek, k=l,2,...,K 
k k 
f S k c S k t where (g^ ,g^ ) are the values used in Problem which determine 
( n k ,; k ) . 
Freeland's proposal has behavioral appeal in that the management 
ft unit provides only the amount of internal tension given goals g and 
—K. 
Ct 
g, and an indication of how this amount of tension would change per 
—K 
unit change in the goal levels. 
Given Assumption 1, the solution procedure for solving Problem 0 
would be as follows: 
Step 1. The Central unit arbitrarily selects goal levels 
ik = < °° a n d Sk = Sk 1 < °° f ° r k = 1 » 2 » " - > K s u c h t h a t I p k i k - 9 f 
c 1 k 
and £ M^g^ > G^. Initially a k = a k = -°° f o r k=l,2,...,K. There are 
k fl cl no constraints of the form (4-28) present. The (g^ ) for k=l,2,. 
K is sent to the respective management unit. 
74 
fl cl 
Step 2. Each management unit receives (g^ ,gk ) from the central 
unit and solves Problem and determines the optimal value of the 
* fl cl fl cl objective function z k ( g k »gk ) a n d tt^. and t t ^ . This information is 
sent to the central unit. Due to Assumption 1, the value of the objec­
tive function of Dual D^ is finite and equal to the value of the objec­
tive function of Problem A^. Therefore the value of the objective func-
1 * fl cl tion of Problem A^ is finite and z k ( g k ,g^ ) > 
Step 3. Since z^ig^ 9g^~) > = - 0 0, the central unit adds a 
constraint of the form (4-28) for each management unit k=l,2,...,K 
to Problem 0-4 and solves Problem 0-4 with one constraint (4-28) cor­
responding to the first extreme point for each management unit. The 
f 2 c 2 2 
solution of Problem 0-4 yields (g^ ,g^ ) and for k=l,2,...,K which 
are sent to the respective management unit. 
At iteration T-1 
Step 4. The central unit would solve Problem 0-4 with (T-1) 
constraints of the form (4-28) for each management unit: 
min I o 
k K 
^ *, ft ctx ft ft ct ct ft f ct c subject to a k > z k(g k ,g R ) - 7jk g - Tjk | k + 2Ik g k + \ g k 
for t=l,2,...,T-1, 
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The resulting optimal values and (g^ ,g^ ) are found and 
f T cT 
(g^ ,g^ ) is sent to management unit K. 
T Step 5. The management unit solves Problem A and the values 
K 
" fT CT fT cT ^ ( g ^ sg^ )» ^ a n ^ ^ a r e sent to the central unit. 
Step 6. The central unit checks to determine if any 
z (g ,g, ) > a, for k=l,2,...,K. If an inequality exists, then a con-
K — K —K K 
straint of the form (4-28) is added. Return to Step 4. If 
f T cT T 
zi(g^ »gr. ) - ar. f ° r k=l,2,..,K, then stop. An optimal solution has 
K —K —K K 
been found for Problem 0. 
Proof that the above iterative procedure will terminate in a 
finite number of iterations with an optimal solution to Problem 0 is 
given by Lasdon [69, p.379]. The solution is optimal in that the final 
values, which are selected by the central unit, for central unit-ori­
ented goals and client-oriented goals for each management unit, and 
which are selected by the management unit for the project activity 
levels, minimize the objective function of Problem 0. Therefore the 
objective of minimizing internal tension, suggested by Georgopoulos and 
Tannenbaum [49], would be satisfied. 
The actual outputs from each management unit related to central 
unit goals and client goals at optimality are given by 
r f T fT J+T 




c T cT + d 
i ik
xik " ik 
Thus, it should be mentioned that the final solution may not satisfy the 
minimal levels of satisfaction of the funder and client (G_ and G ). 
-f -c 
This occurs because there is no assurance that the administrators will 
T 
select final activity levels x., such that 
is satisfied. "This effect shows that the superordinate is either un­
willing or unable to force the subordinates to meet all of the super­
ordinate 's goals" [Freeland, p.178]. However, if a specific goal of the 
funder must be met, it is conceivable that the funder will attempt to 
influence each administrator so that the priorities attached to devia­
tions from the goal guideline are extremely large which would imply 
that the administrator would undergo a great deal of tension if the 
goal were not met. 
A flow diagram of the goal partitioning procedure with an im­
plicit consideration of the client's minimal satisfaction levels is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
The above process includes only the interaction between a super­
ordinate and his administrators and, as such, is a direct extension of 
Freeland's work. The client's minimal satisfaction level is introduced 
as it is perceived by the superordinate. The next section considers 
f T x., ) > G,. or ik ik -f -c l 
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Central Unit fl cl Arbi rily select g < 00, < 00 
for k=l,2,..,K such that fl 
> G_p ana 
k " i -* k 
Set aj~ = -°° for k=l,2,...,K 
I ̂ l" > §f and I "A1 2 §< 
, f l Civ 
(Ik 'Ik } 
t=l 2. Mgt Unit k Solve Problem A?", k 
Detrmine optimal values * ft ct, ft z
k
(ik 'Ik >» Ik > ct ?k * ft Zk(Ik 'I 
CO
 Central Unit hck if 0̂  ̂  k 
for k=l,2,.. 
ft ct 
?k > *k —KYES)—•[Stop, Optimal) 
Central Unit Form constraint of form ^ *, ft ct, f  ft ct ct 
ik Ik 
ft f ct + \ Ik + Hk Ic and add to Problem 0-4 Solve Problem 0-4 and detrmine optimal values t+1 , f(t+l) c(t+l) 
» (r 
>&k
t = t + l 
, f t Ctv 
(Ik 'I > 
Figure 5. Information Flow Diagram of Goal Partitioning 
(Implicit Consideration of a Client) 
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how the client's needs and desires can be explicitly introduced into the 
system. 
Explicit Consideration of a Client 
In this section and 1he following sections, the client is seen as 
an integral part of the planning process of the organization. Rather 
than assumming that the central unit has a perception of only minimal 
client satisfaction levels, it is assumed that the client interacts with 
the organization and provides information based upon his needs, desires 
and dissatisfaction with the product or service available. Two distinct 
types of information, which the organization may seek, are (1) "prefer­
ential" information, which relates the ideal characteristics or attri­
butes for the particular product or service desired by the client, and 
(2) "directional" information, which relates the desired changes of the 
characteristics or attributes for the particular product or service in 
order for that output to come closer to representing an "ideal" output. 
Directional information does not consist of ideal output but only pro­
vides direction for change in the characteristics or attributes of the 
output. 
This research, then, is in line with Douglas' [39] theory of 
marketing in which it is proposed that the marketing activity should 
start with the consumer. Based on McGregor's [79] Theory Y concept, 
Douglas proposes that the consumer be involved in the "planning phases" 
of production as well as in the setting of criteria for decision making 
throughout the total enterprise. This is in contrast to the more usual 
process in which the consumer participated in response to corporate 
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activity through buy-no buy decisions in the marketplace. 
With respect to the individual decision maker in an organization, 
Eichberger [41] relates the importance of both the organization's pur­
pose and its environment, of which the consumer or client is an impor­
tant component: 
The individual decision maker—particularly the managerial 
decision maker—plays a central role in this [organization's 
information/decision making] structure. Yet, without access 
to an understanding of the organization's purpose and the en­
vironment in which the organization exists, he cannot make 
adjustments in accord with any organizational rationale. Nor 
can a decision maker function without being "connected" to the 
appropriate informational channels. The information channels 
not only serve to keep the decision maker informed, but, just 
as importantly, provide a means of making things happen [41]. 
The following discussion considers a few ways in which information from 
the client can be channeled to the decision maker and a possible ana­
lytical description of the process is provided. 
Assume that there is one client or client group which can utilize 
the product or service provided by the organization. The client is 
assumed to have a total set of needs, wants and desires [58,43] of which 
some subset could be satisfied by the product or service of the organi­
zation. Motives, which are the goals of the buyer impinging upon a 
buying situation [58] are derived from the biogenic or psychogenic 
needs, wants, or desires of the consumer that are related to buying and 
consuming a particular product class [16,82]. Choice criteria [58] are 
the set of criteria which function to organize and structure a buyer's 
motives so that the motives that are relevant to the service or product 
are interrelated and ordered in terms of their importance to the buyer 
or client. Thus, choice criteria serve the function of permitting 
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goal-directed behavior [58]. In a similar vein, Baker [7] postulated a 
set of user evaluation criteria, as discussed in Chapter III. It is 
assumed that the client can specify a desired or ideal level for each 
choice criterion. Then, information concerning the proposed output of 
the organization is compared to the established choice criteria by the 
client before any action, i.e. utilization, purchase, refusal to pur­
chase, is taken. However, this approach disregards any influence of 
compeition. 
It is assumed that the information concerning the proposed output 
can be in the form of measurable attributes of the production or service. 
A product or service is viewed as being described by an (r*l) vector G^. 
This information is determined by the organization and is sent to the 
client for evaluation. However, the levels of product or service 
attributes specified by the organization may be misperceived by the 
client. That is, the client may view the attribute levels of the output 
as being different from what the organization believes the true attri­
bute levels are. Leighton [75] states: 
Man acts in terms of what he perceives, and what he per­
ceives must pass not only through his eyes, ears and other 
special senses to reach his consciousness, but also through 
the dark iridescent waters of his beliefs [75]. 
Thus an individual's basic beliefs and the opinions, attitudes, notions, 
convictions, values, and concepts related to these beliefs, influence 
the perception of the attribute levels of a product or service. 
Of course, perception also plays an important aspect in the 
central unit—management unit interactions. Goal levels established by 
the central unit for the administrator of a management unit may be 
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misperceived by the administrator. In a like manner, the degree of 
internal tension and desirable changes in goal levels specified by an 
administrator may be misperceived by the central unit. 
In addition to perception, there may be an amount of stress 
generated by the central unit—management unit interactions which may 
affect decisions made within the organization. The following considera­
tions of stress in an organization are based on the work of Leighton 
[75]. 
In an organization, general types of stress particularly disturb­
ing to the emotions and thoughts of an individual are: 
1. Persistent frustration of goals, desires, needs, inten­
tions, and plans. 
2. Circumstances that promote a dilemna of conflicting and 
mutually incompatible desires and intentions. 
3. Circumstances creating confusion and uncertainty as to 
what is happening in the present and what can happen 
in the future. 
The following specific types of stress are also seen as disturbing to 
the emotions and thoughts of an individual in an organization: 
1. Loss of means of subsistence, whether in the form of 
money, jobs, business, or property. 
2. Rejection, dislike and ridicule from other people. 
3. Capricious and unpredictable behavior on the part of 
those in authority upon whom one 1s welfare depends. 
Leighton notes that "the prevention of excessive stress is not only an 
administrative responsibility, but a very practical requirement for ef­
fective operation" [75, p.262]. 
The models in this dissertation are seen as related to stress in 
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that the central unit attempts to reduce the total amount of dissatis­
faction or frustration associated with an administrator's inability to 
achieve goals established by the central unit and also to reduce a 
client's frustration of not achieving specific need levels. It is 
recognized that other types of stress may be present and may influence 
the acts of administrators and clients; however, these factors are not 
incorporated into the models. 
In regard to a consideration of the effects of competition, the 
concepts of Thibaut and Kelly [102] are used in assuming that the client 
recognizes not only the product from the organization in question, but 
also the best available alternative. This assumption is quite common 
in the marketing and advertising research literature [61,68,78,81]. It 
may be noted that the best available alternative may consist of "do 
nothing," (i.e. not purchase any product or not utilize any service, in 
which case the need or needs are unsatisfied) or a convex combination of 
several competitive alternatives. 
In order to mathematically describe the client's selection, the 
following variables are defined. 
Define and as utilization variables which reflect the use 
of the organization's output and the best available alternative, 
respectively. That is, would indicate the client's decision where 
= 0 indicates no use or purchase of the organization's output, cĉ  = 1 
indicates full use orpurchase of the entire output, and 0 < < 1 indi­
cates partial use or purchase of the output. In a like manner a.^ is the 
utilization variable referring to the purchase or use of the best avail­
able alternative. 
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Two distinct situations, describing two different using or pur­
chasing states, are examined: (1) partial utilization and (2) zero-one 
utilization. In a partial utilization state, the client is allowed to 
purchase a portion of the entire output of the organization. It is 
assumed that the utilization variables are constrained as follows: 
a l + a 2 = 1 9 
0 < a <: 1, 




Constraint (4-29) implies that the total client utilization be one. 
Constraints (4-30) and (4-31) allow the utilization of the organiza­
tion's output and the best available output to vary between no utiliza­
tion and full utilization. One example of a partial utilization state 
would occur when a client purchased raw material from more than one sup­
plier. A second example would occur when a client contracts a number of 
consulting teams, all of whom contribute toward satisfying the overall 
objectives of the client. 
In a zero-one utilization state, the client is allowed only full 
use or no use of either the organization's output or the best available 
alternative. It is assumed that the utilization variables are con­
strained as follows: 
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+ a 2 = 1 (4-29) 
= 0 or 1 (4-32) 
a 2 = 0 or 1 (4-33) 
An example of zero-one utilization state is when a client has a buy-
no buy decision. 
Partial utilization provides a mechanism for being able, in a 
mathematical programming sense, to determine the direction of change for 
each output characteristic. Thus, the model proposed uses "directional" 
information. In zero-one utilization, "preferential" information is 
used due to the inherent difficulties of determining direction of change 
in mixed integer programming model of the overall organizational deci­
sion system. 
In the next section two models of partial utilization are pro­
posed. The first model considers the goal planning process when an 
administrator is allowed to deviate from client-oriented goals and 
several propositions relate the model to observed behavior of organiza­
tions. The second model considers the goal planning process when devi­
ations from client-oriented goals are not allowed. In the second sec­
tion, project redesign is considered, specifically, the attributes of 
a project are seen as being variable subject to technological con­
straints. The incorporation of project redesign in the models presented 
in the previous section is discussed. Zero-one utilization is 
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considered in the third section. The similarities between models used 
in marketing research and the goal programming model for a buy-no buy 
situation are described. In the fourth section, the difficulties in­
herent in a zero-one utilization model are discussed and a model is 
presented. 
Directional Information Models 
(Partial Utilization) 
In the partial utilization situation, the overall problem facing 
the organizational system is stated as: 
Problem I 
+ + - -m i n ™ n + w d +w" d" +w , d +w~ d" ) + (v y + y V ) > (4-34) •fk-fk -fk-fk -ak-ak -ak-ak -ck-ck -ck-ck 
subject to 
I Eikxik " Id4 + Id"fk - l i - 2 
I e ik x ik 
I eikxik 
I Eikxik 
I d * k + I d-ak 




> k=l,2,...,K (4-35) 
I P klk 2 5 G-f k 
(4-36) 
I M,g? - G = 0 f k-k -c (4-37) 
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0 S g k < b k k=l,2,...,K (4-38) 
9 c al + -alt a 2 " Iy- + Iy- = ^ (4-39) 
+ a 2 = 1 (4-40) 
y \ y * o (4-41) 
al' a2 " - (4-42) 
d' ,d\_ > 0 -fk -fk 
*ck'*ck £ 2 
(4-43) 
x.. > 0 for all i, for all k ik ' (4-44) 
is a (r*l) vector characterising the organization's proposed 
output and is defined by (4-37). 
Q 
is an upper bound on g k which is either so large that either 
it is known to include the optimal solution or any solution 
exceeding this bound has no realistic interpretation. 
is a (r*l) vector characterizing the output of the best avail­
able alternative and is assumed fixed. 
is a (r*l) vector which specifies the ideal levels for the 
choice criteria. 
87 
y ,y are (r*l) vectors of positive and negative deviations, respec­
tively, from the ideal levels n. 
v ,v are (l*r) vectors of weights associated with the positive and 
negative deviations y +,y~, respectively, and are specified by 
the client. 
is the client utilization variable associated with the organi­
zation's proposed output. 
a 2 is the client utilization variable associated with the best 
available alternative. 
All other variables, vectors, and matrices are as defined in Problem 0. 
The objective function of Problem I is the sum of internal ten­
sion (discrepancy dissatisfaction) of the management units plus the 
weighted dissatisfaction of the alternatives available to the client. 
Thus the major difference between Problem 0 and Problem I is the inclu­
sion of the client's weighted dissatisfaction. 
It will be shown that Benders' Partitioning Procedure can be used 
to solve Problem I and the behavioral appeal of this approach will be 
discussed. 
Again let Y ^ 9 W k, R , F ^ 9 A R, C ^ 9 and L R for k=l,2,...,K be 
f c 
defined as in Problem 0. Let the set of (g^jg^) be defined by 
S (D = ^ I k » i k ) : I Pkik ~ S F ; ° " ik " 5 K» k=l,2,...,K} k 
Problem I can then be rewritten as 
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Problem 1-1 
F C + + - - + + - -
MIN {I Z K (GJ \G! : ) + ( V Y V Y ' ) ) = il W Y + (Y T Y - Y ~ Y ~ » (4-45) 
subject to 
Fk '4 f 
Ak 0 







, k=l,2,... ,K 
> -g" Ik 
(4-46) 
T M,g C - G = 0 
L k^k -c (4-37) 
G a + G . a_ - Iy + Iy = n -c 1 -alt 2 - - (4-39) 
a l + a 2 = 1 (4-40) 
y , y * o (4-41) 
a a > 
1' 2 (4-42) 
Y k > 0, k=l,2,...,K (4-47) 
(g£,g£) € S(I) (4-48) 
f C f"t ct For a fixed (g^jg^) = (g k ,g^ ) e S(I), the problem becomes 
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Problem I 















Mkik = ?c (4-50) 
G ta 1 + G 14.a_ - Iy + + Iy" -c 1 -alt 2 - - = n (4-51) 
a l + a 2 = 1 (4-40) 
y , y > 0 (4-41) 
o ^ , a 2 > 0 (4-42) 
Y k > 0, k=l,2,...,K (4-47) 
f c t However, with (g^jg^) fixed, Problem I is separable into K + 1 
problems. There are K problems of the form: 
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Problem for each k=l,2,...,K 
, ft Ctv „ „ 
m i n z










Y, > 0 -k (4-54) 
And there is one problem of the form: 
Problem 
t + + - -min V(9 C) = (v y +v y ) (4-55) 
subject to G^ aj_ + 9aj_-ta2 ~ ^ + + I y ~ = n (4-51) 
a l + a 2 = 1 (4-40) 
y , y > 0 (4-41) 
a^, a 2 > 0 (4-42) 
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Using (4-40), let ot̂  = 1 - a^, then Problem C can be written as: 
Problem C - 1 
min V(G^) = (v +y ++v y ) -c - - - - (4-55) 
subject to ( G a l t - ? ^ ) a 2 ~ 1l + I v = < n-G*) (4-56) 
< 1 (4-57) 
y , y > 0 (4-41) 
a 2 > 0 (4-58) 
f & Q Z f ~\ 
Let t t ^ = ( i r ] c » i r k»Hk» 1 T ] < ) be a (lx(f+ak+c+&k)J vector of dual variables for 
Problem and ( 3 , u ) be a ((r+l)xl] vector of dual variables for Problem C* - 1. 
The dual of Problem A, can be written as: 
k 
Dual D, 
f. , ft ctv rt i s f ft A A ^ c ct I I T1 t t . MAX {<J>(gk ,gk ): = { I R ^ +1^+1^ ~-kik'' V k } ^ ~ 5 9 ) 
where 
-L, 
£ ?k- Ik a 5 (4-60) 
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The dual of Problem C - 1 can be written as 
Dual C1 - 1 
max (aCn-G11) + y: (3,y)eB} (4-61) 
- - -c 
where 
B = {(3,y): 5(§ a l t-G^) + y < 0, -v + < 3 * y~, y > 0} 
In order to remove extreme rays from consideration, the following 
assumption is made: 
Assumption 4-2. Assume that a feasible solution exists to Dual D^ and 
Dual C t - 1, the constraint set of Dual D^ is strictly bounded, and the 
constraint set of Dual C*~ - 1 is strictly bounded. Then the maximum 
value of Dual D^ occurs at an extreme point of the constraint set of 
Dual D^ and the maximum value of Dual - 1 occurs at an extreme point 
of the constraint set of Dual - 1 and no extreme rays would exist 
for Dual DT or for Dual C1* - 1. k 




min Y a, + y (4-62) 
k k 
subject to a k > min t\^k+\%k+\^k~\^ (4-63) 
V U k 
for k=l,2,...,K 
Y ^ max [3(n - £ H g C) + u] (4-64) 
(3,u)eB " k K " K 
( g k , g k ) £ R x (4-65) 
Due to Assumption 2, only extreme points need be considered. Let t t , , 
—K 
Sk=l,2,...,Ek be the extreme points for Dual D^ for k=l,2, ,K and let 
T T t 
(3 ,u ), t=1,2,...,T be the extreme point of Dual C - 1. The Problem 
1-2 can be expressed as 
Problem 1-3 
min y a, + Y (4-62) 
k K 
fS k f aS k a cS k c AS^ ^ 








I P kg k > G and 0 < g£ < b k for all k (4-68) 
Proof of finiteness is given by Benders [18] and Lasdon [68] when S(I) 
is closed and bounded. The rows of Problem 1-3 can be generated as 
and when required. 
Given Assumption 2, the solution procedure for solving Problem I 
would be as follows: 
Step 1. The central unit arbitrarily selects goal levels 
g k = g^ 1 < 0 0 and g k = g k X < « for k=l,2,...,K such that £ P ^ 1 > G f 
cl k and 0 < g k < b k for all k. Initially set o k = -°° for k=l,2,...,K and 
Y = -oo. There are no constraints of the form (4-66) or (4-67) present, 
f 1 cl 
The (g, ,g, ) for k=l,2,...,K is sent to the respective management unit 
— K — K cl 
and (l M, g, ) to the client. , k^k fl cl 
Step 2. Each management unit receives (g k ,g k ) from the central 
unit and solves Problem A k and determines the optimal value of the 
fl cl fl cl objective function ^(g^ »gk ) and H k 5 ][k • This information is sent 
to the central unit. The client solves Problem C 1 - 1 and finds the 
* 1 1 
optimal value of the objective function V (GO and (3 ). This informa­
tion is sent to the central unit. Due to Assumption 2, the values of 
the objective functions of Dual D k and Dual C 1 - 1 are finite and equal 
to the values of the objective functions of Problem A k and Problem 
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C-l, respectively. Therefore, the value of the objective function of 
Problem is finite and z^Cgj^"»g^) > - 0 0 and the value of the objective 
function of Problem - 1 is finite and V (Ĝ ") > 
-c 
" fl Cls " 1 
Step 3. Since z k ( g k >g^ ) > = - 0 0 for all k and V (G c) > 
Y = -°° the central unit adds one constraint for each management unit of 
the form (4-66) and one constraint for the client of the form (4-67) 
and the problem becomes 
Problem 1-4. min {£ a, + Y ) (4-62) 
k 
subject to 
^ * fl cl, fl fl cl cl fl f cl c ,„ c n v 
°k " Z k ( I k ' Ik } " \ Ik " \ Ik + \ Ik + \ Ik ( 4 " 6 9 ) 
for k=l,2,...,K 
Y > V £ ( G £ ) + B 1 ( I M k g ^ ) - 3 X ( I M k g ^ ) (4-70) 
k 
I P kg k > G and 0 <; g k < b k for all k (4-68) f - f k 
2 f 2 c2 The solution of this problem yields and (g k ,gk ) 
2 r c2 f2 c2 k=l,2,...,K and GQ = I ^ k g k • (g^ »gk ) a r e sent to management unit k 
2 k 
and G is sent to the client, -c 
At Iteration T-1 
Step 4. The central unit solves Problem 1-4 with at most T - 1 
constraints of the form (4-69) for each management unit and at most 
T - 1 constraints of the form (4-70) for the client. The resulting 
. • -| , T , fT cT, T , „T r „ cT , fl cl, optimal values are a k, (g k ,gk ), Y and G Q = \ M k| k . (g k ,gk ) are 
97 
sent to the respectivemanagement unit and G = ) M, g, is sent to the 
— C K—K 
client. 
T 
Step 5. The management unit solves Problem and the values & fT cT fT cT 2^(gk ,g^ ) 9 ^ » and ir̂  are sent to the central unit. The client T T T solves Problem C - 1 and sends V (G ) and $ to the central unit. 
-c 
Step 6. The central unit checks to determine if any ^(g^ jg^ ) 
T T T > a for k=l,2,...,K or V (G ) > y . If an inequality exists, then a 
K C 
constraint of the form (4-69) or (4-70) is added and return to Step 4. 
ff c T T * T T If z^Cg^ 5 g k ) - 0^ for all k and V (G c) < y , then stop. An optimal 
solution has been found for Problem 1. 
The information flow in the organizational system depicted in the 
above steps may be considered as follows. The central unit initially 
selects the central unit oriented and client-oriented goals. Although 
it is stated that these goals may be arbitrarily selected, the central 
unit may have additional information which aids in the selection of 
"good" starting points. The goals are sent to the respective management 
units and the client-oriented goals are combined to determine the pro­
posed organizational output. 
Each management unit selects the activity levels for each project 
in order to minimize the aim of weighted deviations from central unit 
oriented goals, management unit goals and client-oriented goals. Each 
management unit would then send information related to the minimum 
internal tension and to the desired direction of change (with dual vari­
ables) for central unit oriented and client-oriented goals. 
Using the proposed organizational output and the best available 
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alternative, the client determines the utilization which minimizes his 
weighted dissatisfaction. Information, which conveys the client's dis­
satisfaction and the direction of change of the proposed organizational 
output, is sent to the central unit. 
Given the information from the management units and client, 
the central unit attempts to re-establish central unit-oriented goals 
and client-oriented goals in order to minimize the sum of internal 
tension and client dissatisfaction. 
If the (v +y ++v y ) component of the objective function of Problem 
I is considered as a measure of organizational inflexibility, then the 
total objective of Problem I may be considered as minimizing the sum of 
internal tension and inflexibility. The term inflexibility is used 
since a large value of (v+v*+v y ) at the start of the interaction and a 
reduced value at the end of interaction gives a measure of how flexible 
the organization is being in responsive to a client. 
In Problem I, the central unit might find it desirable to give 
priority to either internal tension or flexibility. In Problem I, the 
central unit has no direct control over the weights given to deviations 
from goals for the management units or over weights given to the devia­
tions from the ideal values for the client. Let and Q 2 be trade-off 
weights, determined by the central unit, between internal tension and 
inflexibility, then the central unit would solve Problem 5 instead of 
Problem 1-4 at iteration T-l. 
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Problem 1 -5 
min {Q^L ok> + Q2Y> (4-71) 
k 
, . . . ^ *, ft Ctv ft ft ct ct A ft f x ct c l u subject to c * k > z k(g k ,g k ) - Tjk g k - 7jk g k + jTk g k + Tjk g k (4-72) 
for t=l,2,...,T-1 
k=l,2,...,K 
Y * V k(G^) + $\\ M k g ^ ) - $\\ M kg^) (4-73) 
for t=l,2,...,T-1 
I P k I k " ?k a n d ° ~ §k - -k f ° r a 1 1 k ( i + _ 7 i + ) k 
Step 5 and Step 6 are the same as for Problem I without the 
trade-off weights. 
If <<< Q 2 > then the central unit would be placing a high empha­
sis upon client satisfaction and a small emphasis upon the administra­
tor's dissatisfaction with client-oriented goals. On the other hand, 
>>> Q 2 would imply a greater emphasis given to internal tension than 
to client satisfaction. 
It should be noted that at the last iteration, say iteration T, 
cT 
g , k=l,2,...,K are the final client-oriented goal levels; however, 
—K 
T 
Xik' * r ° r a 1 1 ^' * r ° r a 1 1 k ' a r e ^ e a c - t u a l activity levels and 
X p? k x T k would be the actual contribution toward goal g k T. If the 
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actual outputs from the management units are sent to the client after 
the final iteration, then the client would be evaluating £ M, (V p?,xT, ) 
•, K . —IK IK cT 1 instead of £ M̂ gr . This leads to the following observation. 
, K—K 
k 
Observation. Even if the central unit is able to establish client-
oriented goals which decrease the amount of client dissatisfaction, the 
actual outputs from the management units may not result in the same 
decrease in client dissatisfaction. 
There exist at least two explanations for the actual output not 
decreasing client dissatisfaction as much as the goal guidelines: 
(1) the goal guidelines may suggest activity levels which do not satisfy 
the exogenous inequality constraints, or (2) the administrator assigns 
low priorities to client-oriented goals and high priorities are assigned 
to funder or administrator-oriented goals. In the former instance, one 
would expect the administrator to indicate the infeasibility of meeting 
the client-oriented goals. In the latter instance, the administrator 
may emphasize any conflicts which exist in attaining both funder-
oriented and client-oriented goals. 
In addition, the central unit may emphasize internal tension of 
the organization by choosing a much larger than 0^ in Problem 1-5. 
If this occurs and if the management units place a low priorities (small 
values of w ^ k > w c k ) upon the deviations from client-oriented goals rela­
tive to the priorities upon deviations from central unit oriented goals 
or management unit goals, then the client has little or no impact upon 
both the proposed output or actual output. On the other hand, if the 
central unit places a high priority upon the client-oriented goals and 
1 0 1 
the management units do likewise, then the client has a large impact 
upon the organization's decisions. These comments suggest the following 
two observations: 
Observation. If central unit emphasizes the minimization of internal 
tension and/or administrators place a low priority upon achieving 
client-oriented goals, then improved client-oriented output would occur 
only if it was a by-product of achieving central unit and/or adminis­
trator-oriented goals. 
Observation. If the central unit emphasizes the flexibility of the 
organization to respond to client dissatisfaction and administrators 
place high priorities upon client-oriented goals, then the organization 
appears to act as though it were controlled by the client. 
With respect to the first proposition, an extreme form of 
behavior of professionals in service organizations, which has been 
observed, is that administrators lose sight of the interests of their 
users or clients [62,28]. This loss of interest was due to the admin­
istrators' concern with their own status or career or through preoccu­
pation with administrative problems. This is reflected in the model, 
in the former instance, when an administrator overemphasizes, i.e. place 
a high weight, upon deviations from his established goals, and in the 
latter instance, when the funder has a main concern of minimizing his 
administrators' dissatisfaction or an administrator attempts to achieve 
funder-oriented objectives without concern for client-oriented objec­
tives. The end result in the real life situation is that the 
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organization ceases to be responsive to user needs. The same end 
result would also be reflected by the model. 
With respect to the second proposition, the other extreme form 
of behavior observed in service organizations is that administrators 
become captives of their users and essentially surrender to them the 
power to determine the nature of the service furnished [62,28]. This 
form of behavior would be illustrated by the indirect client influence 
model when the funder establishes a high priority to increasing client 
utilization and the administrators place a high priority upon client-
oriented goals relative to funder-oriented or their own goals. In this 
situation both the funder and administrator become extremely sensitive 
to feedback from the client in order to improve the output as viewed by 
the client with almost complete disregard for their own goals. The 
organization is seen as being over-responsible to the user, which may 
mean, in a service organization, that the professional no longer uses 
his skills and training in determining an improved service for the 
client. 
It is important to recognize that the indirect client influence 
model not only can reflect the end results which have been observed in 
organizations, but also appears consistent with the process by which the 
results are obtained. 
Since there may exist a difference between the client-oriented 
goals and the actual output at the last iteration, the central unit may 
attempt to give a guarantee that the proposed output and the actual 
output will be identical. This may be accomplished in the overall 
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organization system problem by not allowing the management units to 
deviate from the client-oriented goals. The problem may be written 
as 
Problem II 
MIN L L ^ f k ^ f k f e a k ^ a k ^ + ( Y Y + Y T » (4-75) 
I p i k x i k - I d f k + I d f k - X I - ° 
L 2ikxik 
? E i k x i k 
I B i k x i k 
1 
Id . + Id . -ak -ak ik 
= 0 
> k=l,2,...,K (4-76) 
I Pkik * G-f (4-77) 
0 < g k < b k for all k (4-78) 
Mkik " 1G-o - °- (4-79) 
% « ! + ?alta2 " XX + XX' = n (4-80) 
a l + a 2 = n (4-81) 
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> 0 for all k (4-82) 
> 0 for all k (4-83) 
x. ik > 0 for all i, for all k (4-84) 
y \ y ~ ^ o (4-86) 
a x,a 2 > 0 (4-86) 
The development of a solution procedure would be similar to the 
procedure developed for Problem I and will not be repeated. A few 
comments are in order, however. First of all, if there exists a feasi­
ble solution to Problem II, then the output expected by the client at 
T 
the final iteration G is received by the client since no deviations 
from client-oriented goals are allowed. Secondly, since the central 
unit is establishing the goals without specific information from the 
management units regarding the project attributes, a problem of feasi­
bility might easily arise. 
In the next section, the possibility of project redesign is 
considered. 
Project Redesign 
Consider the partial utilization situation in which the problem 
facing the organizational system can be described by Problem I. 
-c 
1 0 5 








fixed. It is now assumed that the project vectors are selected from a 
convex set which may be defined by the technological constraints related 
to a specific project area. Thus a partial utilization situation with 
the allowance of project redesign may be stated as: 
Problem I-RD which is defined as Problem I with p., e J., , where J., is -ik ik' ik 
a convex set. For simplicity, it can be assumed that the set is 
defined as 
Jik = { 2 i k : A ik2ik " ?ik } f o r a 1 1 f o r a 1 1 k 
where 
is a (m>:(f+ak+c+£k)) matrix, whose rows determine the linear combi­
nation of project attributes which are restricted by m techno­
logical limits. 
C is an (mxl) vector of technological limits. 
Dantzig [33] refers to this type of problem, in which there are 
variable project attribute vectors, as a generalized linear programming 
problem. 
Since the same basic partitioning scheme may be used with Problem 
I-RD as was used with Problem I, it is not repeated here. However, the 
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solution procedure is modified and will be described. The solution 
procedure for solving Problem I-RD is as follows: 
Step 1. The central unit arbitrarily selects goal levels 
f fl c cl v fl 
Ik = Ik < °° a n d Ik = Ik < °° f o r k = 1 ' 2 ' - - - ' K s u c h t h a t L p k I k " 
1 k G and 0 < g!~ < b, for all k. Initially set a = -» for k=l,2,...,k 
—T —k —K k 
and y = There are no constraints of the form (4-66) or (4-67) 
fl cl 
present. The (g k ,gk ) for k=l,2,...,K is sent to the respective man-
agement unit and (£ ̂ ^6^ ) is sent to the client. 
k 
f 1 cl 
Step 2. Each management unit receives (g k ,gk ) from the central 
un it and selects an arbitrary p^ k e J^k for i=l,2,... ,nk« Using the 
p!, and (gf\gf^") the management unit solves Problem k}~ or Dual D^ and ik —k —k K k 
determines the optimal value of the objective function z^g^ »gk ) and 
( t t j ^ " , t t J ^ " , t t ^ ,-n^). Then, the management unit would send (gĵ ",gĵ ") 
t t 5 \ tt?^" to the central unit. The client solves Problem C*~ - 1 and 
—K —k 
ft 1 1 
finds the optimal value of the objective function V (G ) and 3 . This 
-c 
information is sent to the central unit. Using Assumption 2, 
z (g^jg^ 1) and V (G ) are finite, k —k — K —c 
Step 3. Project redesign—a new project would be more desirable, 
i.e. considered for acceptance, if the simplex optimality criterion were 
not satisfied which occurs if minC - T r^p^) < 0. Thus it would be desir-
ui 4. • • • r 1 ^ / fl f al a cl c Hi. ™ 4., able to minimize (-T kP l k) = ?ik+~k Six -k £ik~-k ^ik* * 
administrator would solve the following redesign problem for each 
project i=l,2,...,nk which can be considered for redesign. 
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Problem RD* ik— 
subject to A. kp. k s 5.k 
The optimal solution, P^k^ would be added as an additional column to 
Problem A^, if - t t . ^ P ^ ^ < 0. If (-ir^p^^) > 0, then the redesigned k -k-ir -k-ik & 
project would not need to be considered for entrance into an administra­
tor's set of projects since it would not be advantageous for the purpose 
of minimizing the value of the management unit's objective function. 
* fl cl * 1 Step 4. Since z (g ,g, ) > a = -°° for all k and V (G ) > y = 
K — K —K K —C 
-00, the central unit adds one constraint for each management unit of the 
form (4-66) and one constraint for the client of the form (4-67) and 
2 f 2 c 2 Problem 1-4 is solved. The solution yields a, and (g ,g, ), k=l,2,..., 
K —K —K 
2 2 2 f 2 o2 K and G = 5" M, g, . G is sent to the client and (g, ,g, ) are sent to -c L k-k -c -k -k 
the management unit. 
At iteration T-l 
Step 5. The central unit solves Problem 1-4 with at most T-l 
constraints of the form (4-69) for each management unit and at most T-l 
constraints of the form (4-70) for the client. The resulting optimal 
T , fT c T v T , _T v M cT . fT cT. ^ ^ values are a k, (g k ,gk ), y , and G^ = \ M kg . (g k ,gk ) are sent to 
T . 
the respective management unit and G^ is sent to the client. 
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T 
To determine the final project attributes for project i of management 
(1) (2) (T) 
unit k, let p^ k ,p^k ,...,p^k be the arbitrary and redesigned projects 
(1) (2) (T) 
introduced and x. ,x., ,...,x., be the final activity levels associated 
IK IK IK 
with the arbitrary and redesigned projects. Any solution to Problem 
I-RD with projects added can be rewritten back in the original form of 
(1) (2) (T) Problem I-RD by setting x i k = + x^. + . . . + x ^ k and letting the 
coefficients of x^ k be given by 
Step 6. The management unit solves Problem A and the values 
K 
Z k ^ k ^ '^k^' ^k^ a n <^ ^k^ a r e s e r r t t o c e n ' t r a l u nit. t t ^ is used with 
project i of management unit k for possible project redesign. The 
T ** T T client solves Problem C -1 and sends V (G ) and 3 to the central unit. -c 
Step 7. The central unit checks to determine if any 
z (g, ,g ) > a for k=l,2, ,K or V (G ) > y . If an inequality 
K - K —K K — C 
exists, then a constraint of the form (4-69) or (4-70) is added and 
return to Step 5. 
T T The management unit solves Problem RD. using tt . If 
IK —K 
(T) T (T) any one new redesign, i=l,2,. . . ,n, , p., is such that Trup.u > 0, then 
K —lK — K—lk 
added the project and return to Step 6. 
If z k ( g k \ g k ) < ak for all k, V (G^) £ y\ and 
T (T) 
T r k p ^ k < 0 for all i and all k, then stop. An optimal solution has been 
found for Problem I-RD. 
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r: , (l) x (2) x ^ (TK ^ _ for (x., +x., + . . . + X . , ) > 0. 
IK IK IK 
The right-hand side is clearly a convex combination of T points lying 
in a convex set defined by as a consequence the point p ^ must lie 
in this convex set also. 
Dantzig [32, Ch.22] shows that the solution procedure is finite 
and if any project added to Problem A, is not active, it may be dropped 
K 
from the current set of projects because it is included in the convex 
set J_̂ k defining the redesigned projects. Therefore, if a project is 
redesigned by solving Problem RD^, and the resulting project has char-
lK 
acteristics which satisfy the acceptance criterion (i.e. "^P^k^O) > 
then the inclusion of the project in the current set of alternatives 
should decrease an administrator's internal tension. 
Although project redesign was considered with Problem I, there is 
no addition difficulty of allowing project redesign, p^^ € for all 
i, for all k in Problem II. 
In addition, there would be no difficulty in not attempting a 
project redesign at each iteration. Since an administrator may be 
viewed as attempting to minimize deviations without going through the 
additional step of project redesign, there is no difficulty in rede­
signing after central unit-management unit interaction has terminated 
given an initial set of projects. Essentially, the management unit 
would arbitrarily select a set of projects, and interaction with the 
central unit would occur as specified in the steps for solving Problem 
" fT cT 
I. Since at optimality for Problem I, there may exist Zi^g^. »gk ) > 0, 
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the kth management unit may seek to decrease z^ig^ ,g^ ) be redesigning 
T one or more projects using the optimal tt . If project ik may be re-
—K 
T i l T designed so that "^Pik < 0 a n d P^^ £ then Problem may be 
resolved with an additional project column specifying the redesigned 
1 T 1 1 project Pj^' Since " ^ P ^ K 0> project ik is eligible to be activated 
and the resulting optimal value z^(g^ 9g^ < z^ C g ^ j g ^ ). In addi-
fT1 cT 1 
tion, the optimal dual values t t ^ , t t ^ may be used to renew interac­
tion with the central unit. 
Attitude Measurement and Goal Programming 
Much of literature in the marketing and advertising areas is 
aimed at determining and measuring a consumer's attitude toward a par­
ticular brand. Although many definitions of attitude have been given, 
Allport [2] provides an encompassing definition which can be stated as: 
"An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized 
through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the 
individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is 
related [2, p.8]. Although an attitude is seen as a "state of readi­
ness," Allport goes on to mention that "an attitude characteristically 
provokes behavior that is acquisitive or avertive, faborable or un­
favorable, affirmative or negative toward the object or class of objects 
with which it is related" [2, p.8]. Thus an attitude is believed to 
lead to some type of response. 
In attempting to measure attitude, Fishbein [43] proposes a model 
in which an individual's attitude toward any object is considered as a 
function of (1) the strength of his beliefs about the object and (2) the 
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evaluative aspects of those beliefs. A simple additive model of the 
form is given as 
N 
A = I B a (4-50) 
j=l 3 3 
where A^ is the attitude toward object 0, B.. is the strength of belief 
j about 0, a_. is the importance of belief j, and N is the number of 
beliefs about 0. 
Rosenberg [86] using a consistency principle, predicted that 
affect (the amount of liking) attached to an object would be highly 
related to the perceived instrumentality of the object, i.e. the judged 
probability that the object would lead to, or block, attainment of 
valued states and the value importance, i.e. the intensity of affect 
expected from these valued states. Stated mathematically, Rosenberg's 
model is 
N 
A., = I (PI. VI..) (4-51) ik ink in 3=1 
where 
A^ k = attitude toward an object k expressed in terms of an individual 
i's degree of like-dislike of that object. 
PI.., = individual i's perceived instrumentality of the kth object 
3 toward attaining or blocking the jift goal or value. 
V I = value importance to an individual i of the ji/z goal or value. 
Similar theories are proposed by Smith [97], Cartwright [23], Zajonc 
[110] and Peak [84]. Fishbein notes that "the important point is that 
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all of them essentially lead to the hypothesis that an individual's 
attitude toward any object is a function of his beliefs about the object 
and the evaluative aspects of those belifs" [43, p.395]. However, mar­
keting researchers have selected the Fishbein model to evaluate experi­
mentally and therefore most research in the marketing area pertaining 
to attitudes of consumers has aimed at evaluating and validating the 
Fishbein model. 
In the recent literature there has been a controversy over 
whether or not the predictive power of a simple model of perceived 
instrumentality without value importance (Model 2) is better than the 
predictive power of the Fishbein Model (Model 1): 
Model 1: A.. = J" PI.., • VI. . 
ik v ljk i j 
Model 2: A. . = ) PI. 
in u. iih 
3 
Sheth and Talarzyk [94],Lutz and Howard [77], and Moinpour and MacLach-
lan [80] all report that the inclusion of importance weights decreases 
the predictive power of the model and thus Model 2 was seen as a better 
predictor of brand preference than Model 1. Little difference in pre­
dictive power between the two models was found by Hansen and Bolland 
[55], Cohen and Houston [29], Scott and Bennett [92], Hughes and 
Guerrero [59], Churchill [27], Wilkie and Weinreich [109], and Beckwith 
and Lehmann [17]. Finally, increases in predictive power were illus­
trated by Model 1 by Anderson and Fishbein [5], Hansen [54], Lehmann 
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[74], Bass, Pessemier, and Lehmann [11], Bass and Talarzyk [13], Hoepfl 
and Huber[57]. However, a review and analysis of the above studies by 
Bass and Wilkie [14] found major differences in the methods of analysis 
which appear to have led to different conclusions. The use of cross-
sectional information in making predictions of preference, as opposed to 
using information from individual consumers to predict preference for 
brands for individual consumers, has led to lowering the predictive 
power of Model 1. In addition, normalizing the data was found to in­
crease the predictive power of Model 1. The interested reader is 
referred to a paper by Wilkie and Pessemier [108] which reviews 33 
marketing studies related to the Fishbein model. 
Next,it is shown that a goal programming model of a zero-one 
purchase decision and a Fishbein product selection model predict the 
same decision by an individual when a product's attributes are less 
than or equal to the ideal levels. 
Let 
G be a (rxl) vector of product attributes which represent the per-
~ c ceived instrumentality values of the organization's product. 
G ^ t be a (rxl) vector of product attributes which represent the per­
ceived instrumentality values of the best available alternative. 
v be a (lxr) vector of weights representing the value importance of 
attaining the j=l,2,...,r goals or ideal levels. 
n be a (rxl) vector representing r goal or ideal levels desired by 
the client. 
y be a (rxl) vector representing negative deviations from the ideal 
levels. 
Then a Fishbein selection model which considers the organization's 
product and the best available alternative may be written as 
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max[(v G )a. + (v G ,.)a 0] (4-52) - -c 1 - -alt 2 
a J [ + a 2 = 1 (4-53) 
o ^ , a 2 = 0,1 (4-54) 
where a^, c * 2 are scalars which represent selection of the organization's 
product (a =1, a 2=0) or the best available alternative (ct^=0, ct2=l). 
Since none of the product attributes are assumed to exceed any ideal 
level and only one product may be selected, it can easily be seen that 
positive deviations from the idealJevel are non-existent and what has 
been termed a "one-sided goal programming problem" [40] can be stated 
as: 
min v y (4-55) 
?c ai + ?alt a2 + I = 2 ( 4 " 5 6 ) 
a + a 2 = 1 (4-53) 
a x , a 2 = 0,1 (4-54) 
Lemma. If the perceived instrumentality of a product's attribute j, 
j=l,2,...,r of achieving an ideal goal level n_., j=l,2,...,r, is less 
than or equal to that ideal level, then the Fishbein selection model 
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and the one-sided goal programming model are identical, 
Proof. Rewriting (4-56) as 
y = 5 " V l " ° a l t V 
the goal programming model can be stated as 
min v (n-G a -G n ) - -c 1 -alt 2 
a 1 + a 2 = 1 
<*•!_, a 2 = 0,1. 
Since v n is a constant it can be dropped, so that the problem becomes 
min[-(v~G )a -(v~G )a 0] - -c 1 - -alt 2 
a i + a 2 = 1 
a x, a 2 = 0,1 
or 
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max[(v G )a, t (v G 
a 1 t a 2 = 1 
a a 2 = 0,1 
which is the Fishbein selection model. Q.E.D. 
The above proposition, relating the one-sided goal programming 
model and the Fishbein model, illustrates that a goal programming model 
is in line with current research in the marketing area. Actually, the 
standard goal programming model may be considered more general in the 
sense that it allows for an individual to be dissatisfied (exhibit dis­
like) for a product whose attribute levels exceed the desired or ideal 
levels. 
Model) or the measurement of product or service dissatisfaction (goal 
programming model) does not necessarily provide proof that the object 
or service will be bought or utilized. Howard and Sheth [58] propose 
that "intention" to purchase follows attitude formation and precedes the 
overt act of purchasing or using the specific brand. However, it is 
difficult to determine intention and purchase or utilization in the 
planning phase. Thus,the organization is led to use the choice cri­
teria or needs level and the client's evaluation for the purpose of 
producing a more acceptable product or service. 
Of course the measurement of attitude toward an object (Fishbein 
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A Preferential Information Model (Zero-One Utilization) 
In a situation in which the client has a zero-one decision 
(Problem I with constraint (4-42) replaced by ct^=0,l and a 2=0,l), the 
introduction of integer utilization variables present difficulties since 
dual variables associated with the integer part of the problem do not 
provide the same information as the dual variables associated with the 
linear problem [9]. Although there have been investigations which have 
dealt with changes in the constraint vector (n) and changes in the coef­
ficients in the objective function [21], this author could not find any 
published research dealing with changes in the product output vector 
(G^). Thus, it is necessary to take a slightly different approach in 
attempting to determine an appropriate organizational output. 
First of all, it should be mentioned that if the client responds 
with an ct̂  = 1, then the organization has no problem. However, if 
client utilization is zero and the organization desires to have a 
utilization of one, then there would exist a problem for the organiza­
tion since it desires to have its product bought or utilized. 
There are basically two approaches that the organization might 
take if ct̂  = 0: (1) attain information about the choice criteria and 
the respective need levels, or (2) attain information about the best 
available alternative. If the second approach is taken, the organiza­
tion might attempt to produce an output comparable to the best available 
alternative (in one sense this would be an attempt to duplicate the 
competitor1s output). 
Of course the first approach would be preferable since it is 
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b.is ic<) 1 ly .in ciLtompt to get information which couJ.d be used in producing, 
an output which would satisfy the need levels of the client. This 
approach would always be taken if the organization were able to deter­
mine ideal need levels and client priorities. If this were the case, 
then Problems I and II would not be needed. The attempt to attain 
preferential information is essentially the approach taken in marketing 
studies when researchers ask the respondents to describe an "ideal" 
brand. If the central unit could attain information about the "ideal" 
attribute levels n and the weights associated with the positive and 
negative deviations from the ideal levels (v+,v ), then using the same 





I £ikXik " I dfk + I dfk " ^ k 0 
\ -ikxik *-ak + I dak 
a 
f k=l,2,..., K (4-56) 
I PikXik " I dck + ^ck " Jik 0 
i B ik x ik 
1 
•k 




I M kg£ - Ih + + Ih" = n ( 4 - 5 8 ) 
d* d" > 0 -fk-fk 
-ak-ak ~ -
d , ,d , > 0 -ck-ck 
> for all k (4-59) 
x.. > 0 for all i, all k ik (4-60) 
0 ^ < b k for all k (4-61) 
h +,h £ 0 (4-62) 
where h ,h are used instead of y , y to differentiate between devia­
tions without considering the best available alternative and deviations 
considering the best available alternative. 
Letting Y^, W^, ir̂ , F , A^, C k and L k for k=l,2,...,K be defined 
f c 
as in Problem I and defining the set (g k,g k) as 
S(III) = ((g k,g k): I P kg k * G f; 0 < g£ S b k , k=l,2,...,K}, 
k 
Problem III can be written as 
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Problem III-l 









, k=l,2,...,K (4-64) 
* "g S k 
I M,g° - Ih + + Ih = n (4-58) 
Y, > 0 for all k -k (4-65) 
(gj^g£) < S(III) 
f c 
For a fixed (g^jg^) 
ft ct 
(g^ »gk ) 6 S(III), the problem becomes 
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Problem III 
m i n ( I W k X k ) (4-66) 
subject to 
- L , 
ft 
= ik 
= i k 
*k < , k-1,2,... ,K 
ct 
= i k 
(4-67) 
Y k > 0 for all k (4-65) 
c - - + + Note that for a fixed g , the value (v h +v h ) is specified and 
— K — — — — 
( v~h ~ + v +h +) along with Equation (4-58) are not required in stating the 
problem. 
f c t As before, with (g^,gk) fixed, Problem III is separable into K 
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Y, ^ 0 -k (4-70) 
Using the same procedure for the transforming Problem III as was used 
in Problem 0, making Assumption 1 to eliminate extreme rays from the 
Dual D*, and noting that (v +h ++v h ) and constraint (4-58) are necessary 
K 
Q 
only when solving for g^, Problem III can be expressed as: 
Problem III-2 
minE^ a, + ( v h + v h ) ] (4-71) 
subject to 
„ * , f S k ° V f S k f S k c S k c S k , f S k f c S k c ,„ , „ 
°k - z k ( I k -§k } - \ §k - I k s k + Ik §k + \ s k ( 4 - 7 2 > 
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I M, g°, - Ih + + Ih" = n (4-58) 
k K - K — — — 
I P kg£ * G f (4-57) 
0 < g£ < b, for all k (4-61) 
h +,h~ > 0 (4-62) 
where the constraints of the form (4-72) can be generated as and when 
ji f-£ ct ft ct t 
necessary by using z k ( g k ig^ ^ ̂ k 5 \ ^ r o m P r°bi e m A^. 
The solution procedure for solving Problem III is identical to 
Problem 0 given Assumption 1 with the following changes 
1. The constraint I M,g? > G is replaced by (4-58), (4-61) 
and (4-62). 
2. The central unit solves a problem of the form Problem III-2 
instead of Problem 0-4. 
To allow the central unit to trade-off internal tension and 
"ideal product dissatisfaction" (v +h ++v h ), trade-offs weights and 
Q 2 may be assigned so that at any iteration T, the central unit would 
solve a problem of the form: 
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Problem III-5 
min [Q o ) + Q 2(v +h ++v~h~)] (4-73) 
k 
^ */ f t ctv ft ft ct ct A ft f c c . . 
Sublet tO Q k > Z k(g k ,gk ) - 7Jk g k - 7Tk g k + 7Jk g k + T r ^ (4-74) 
for t=l,2,...,T, k=l,2,...,K 
I M k Ik ' T - + + = - (4-58) k 
I ?d 2 G-f ( 4 - 5 7 ) 
k 
0 < g k < b k for all k (4-61) 
h +, h" > 0 (4-62) 
If the p., could be selected from a convex set J., for Problem III, -ik ik ' 
then project redesign could easily be incorporated into the solution pro­
cedure as described in an earlier section. 
Summary 
In this chapter several normative models of an organizational de­
cision system are developed. A model in which the client is implicitly 
considered, is developed based on Freeland's goal partitioning procedure. 
Minimum satisfaction levels for both the central unit and the client are 
used to determine goals for the management units. The objective function 
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of the overall problem stresses minimization of the sum of weighted 
deviations from management unit goals. Thus the management units are 
the focal point and the central unit and client only introduce lower 
limit constraints. This model appears to be analogous to Baker's gen­
eral analytical model of resource allocation. 
Based on the assumption that the client should have an impact 
upon decisions made within the organization, two types of information, 
directional and preferential, are defined and used as the basis for 
explicitly including the client in organizational decision system models. 
Directional information from the client is used by the organiza­
tion to determine the changes which would increase the acceptability of 
the output by the client. Preferential information from the client con­
sists of preferred attribute levels that it would be desirable for the 
output to have. 
Directional information for the purpose of making an output more 
acceptable to a client was seen as necessary when the organization is 
unable to ascertain preferred or "ideal" need levels of the client and 
the priorities associated with those levels. Consequently, a case 
termed partial utilization was discussed and two resulting mathematical 
programming models were presented. The objective function for the models 
included both the total internal tension (sum of weighted deviations from 
goals) and client dissatisfaction with available outputs. The available 
outputs consisted of the output of the organization and the best avail­
able alternative. 
The first model was designed to allow the actual output of each 
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management unit to deviate from the client-oriented goals. The second 
allowed no deviation. A goal partitioning approach was used to decom­
pose the overall problems and it was found that the client may be 
treated as an additional subordinate unit. It was noted, however, that 
in the first model the procedure required the client to evaluate pro­
posed output, not actual output, from the organization. Therefore, a 
second model, which did not allow the management units to deviate from 
client-oriented goals, was proposed. From a behavioral standpoint, one 
of the difficulties associated with the solution procedure is that the 
client interacts with the organization each time the management units 
interact with the central unit. In many situations, the interaction 
between the central unit and management unit is completed before inter­
action with a client begins. Descriptive models are presented in Chap­
ter VI which attempt to alleviate some of the descriptive shortcomings 
of the models presented in this chapter. 
If projects may be redesigned, then a criterion for specifying 
the preferred attributes of a redesigned project is developed. A solu­
tion procedure based on generalized linear programming, is incorporated 
in the partial utilization models to allow for redesign. 
Several observations which related not only the end results of 
the procedure but also the means by which the system operated to extreme 
forms of behavior in actual organizations were presented. 
Preferential information for the purpose of determining the 
attributes of a product or service which are as close as possible to 
a client's ideal was used as a basis for developing a third model which 
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explicitly includes the client. Again based on a goal partitioning 
scheme, the central unit was viewed as attempting to determine central 
unit oriented goals and client-oriented goals for each management unit 
so that the total internal tension plus weighted deviations from a 
client's desired output is minimized. 
In the models discussed in this chapter, a basic assumption was 
that only one client or one group of clients with homogeneous needs 
interacted with the organization. In the next chapter, three models 




MULTI-CLIENT ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION SYSTEM MODELS 
Introduction 
The organizational system models in the last chapter are composed 
of three primary groups: the central unit, the management unit, and the 
client. They are based on an assumption that the client is one individ­
ual or a group of individuals whose needs (or more specifically, need 
levels) are homogeneous. In addition, the organization is seen as pro­
ducing one product or providing one service. 
This chapter introduces the concept of multi-client or multiple 
groups of clients. Three decision rules for determining the organiza­
tion's output are discussed when the output again consists of producing 
one product or providing one service. In the multi-client situation, 
the number of need levels are assumed to be the same as are the need 
dimensions but the values of the need levels and the weights assigned 
to deviations are assumed to vary for each client. In the multiple 
group situation, the need levels within a group are assumed homogeneous, 
whereas the need levels between groups are assumed heterogeneous. Thus 
both situations are similar in nature. 
An Organizational System with Multiple Client Groups 
Assume that the organization's output is of interest to J poten­
tial client groups. A client group j is assumed to have a number of 
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ideal need levels, described by the (rxl) vector n.., which may be satis­
fied by purchasing or using the output of the organization. The organ­
ization is thus faced with the problem of determining the characteris­
tics of its single output when a number of different need levels (n^, 
n_,...,nT} are desired by the clients. The above assumption reflects - 2 - J 
the change in marketing research from describing consumers on the basis 
of geographic and demographic factors to describing consumers on the 
basis of sociological and psychological characteristics. 
In recent years market research has made substantial progress 
in describing consumers. It no longer lists merely the demo­
graphic attributes, but also more and more social and psycho­
logical attributes of the consumers, it no longer simply describes 
requirements, but goes into needs, desires, and their intercon­
nections . For this purpose a number of strongly differentiated 
consumer typologies have been produced of late [112, p.482]. 
Zernish [111] emphasizes the trend toward close contact with the 
consumer in product development. In a study of the "subcompact" auto­
mobile market, Teach and Neidell [101] used cluster analysis and non-
metric multidimensional scaling to develop "psychological market seg­
ments. This study is a contrast to most market segmentation studies 
which use demographic and/or geographic locations of customers. The 
authors note: 
Whenever a product faces a large number of buyers, it is 
generally possible to divide the buyers into separate groups or 
segments. Each segment is designed to be as homogeneous as 
possible while at the same time the differences between the 
segments are as great as possible. The result is that the 
people in each segment look for different attributes in the 
product they buy to satisfy their specific needs and desires. 
The benefit of segmentation is at least three fold. 
1) Marketing management is in a better position to spot 
and compare opportunities. 
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2) The seller can use his knowledge of response functions 
for each of the segments to guide the allocation of 
his marketing budget. 
3) The seller can make finer adjustments of his product 
and market appeals. Instead of s "shot gun" approach 
covering vast heterogenous groups of customers he can use 
a "rifle" approach. He can take careful aim to the spe­
cific needs and wants of one or more particular segments 
[101, pp. 7,10]. 
Thus, it can be seen that the assumptions in this dissertation 
related to client groups are in concordance with those in one current 
marketing research area. 
The next three sections present three mathematical models for 
determining the characteristics of an organization's output when there 
exist multiple groups of clients which can be described or segmented in 
terms of their needs. 
Minimizing the Sum of Internal Tension 
and Weighted Client Group Dissatisfaction 
In the first model to be discussed, the organization is seen as 
attempting to minimize internal tension plus the sum of weighted client 
dissatisfaction with the organization's output subject to organizational 
goals and constraints. It is assumed that the central unit has knowledge 
of the ideal attribute levels n̂ . for each client group j=l,2,...,J. 
Using the same notation as in Chapter IV, the problem for the central 
unit may be stated as: 
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Problem IV 
+ T N.(vtht+v.hT)} j D -D-D "D-D 
(5-1) 
subject to 
i E l k - * 4 + 1 & - ^ 
I p* 4- ̂ ikxik i 
I Eikxik 
1 
*-ak + "'"-ak 
Id , + Id . -ck -ck 
I 





\ k = 1,2,...,K (5-2) 
c Ih. + Ih. = n. -] -] -] 
h., h. > 0 -D -D 
\> for j = 1,2,...,J (5-3) 
I Pklk * G-f (5-4) 
5 - Ik ~ -k f ° r a 1 1 k (5-5) 
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>̂ for all k (5-6) 
x. ik > 0 for all i, for all k (5-7) 
where N_., j=l,2,...,J is a scalar weighting factor assigned by the cen­
tral unit to group j . N_. may refer to the number of individuals in 
group j or to the relative importance of group j with respect to the 
other groups. 
Problem IV is similar to Problem III discussed in Chapter IV. 
In this situation, even though there are J client groups, instead of 
c r + + - -
only one, fixing g^ fixes I N_.(v_.h_.tv_.h_.). Therefore, a goal parti­
tioning scheme can be used to solve Problem IV. Recognizing that with 
f c 
(gi^»gi) fixed, each management unit can be viewed as solving Problem 
— K — K 
A^, described in Chapter IV, the following solution procedure, given 
K 
Assumption 1 of Chapter IV, can be stated: 
unit. 
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Step 2. Each management unit solves Problem and determines 
.;. fi ci fi cl the optimal values z, (g ,g, ), tt and tt . Due to Assumption 1, 
K —k —K - K - K 
.'. fl cl 
z^(gv > S i ^ ) > ""00• ^he optimal values are sent to the central unit. 
K -K — K 
Step 3. Since z (gf\gf > = the central unit solves the 
K — K —K K 
following problem: 
Problem IV-1 
min[Y a. + Y N.(vtht+v.h.)] 
k k j 3 -3-3 
, . _ _ >'v fl cl, fl fl cl cl fl f clc c n l . subject to ak > zR(gk , | k ) - Tjk gR - Hk | k + Ik £k + * k gR, for all k 
I M kik " + X-j = -j' 3=1,2,...,J 
ht, h. > 0 for all j 
-3 "3 
I P k§k " - f ; - ~ i k ~ - k f ° r a 1 1 k 
2 
The solution of Problem IV-1 yields a k, k=l,2,...,K 
f2 c2 f2 c2 and (g k ,gk ), k=l,2,...,K. The (g k ,gk ) are sent to the respective 
management unit. 
At iteration T-l 
Step 4. The central unit would solve the following problem: 
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Problem IV-2 
min[) a, + ) N.(v.h.+v.h.)] 
T k A 3 - 3 - 3 - 3 - 3 
(5-8) 
subject to 
^ *, ft ct, ft ft ct ct x ft f ̂  ct c a , 
a k " Z k ( Ik 'Ik } " Hk Ik ' k̂ Ik + \ Ik + *k Ik ( 5 " 9 ) 
for t=l,2,...,T-1 
k=l,2,...,K 
I Mklk " ^ + ^ = Bj 
hT, h. > 0 
3 - 3 
^ j=l,2,...,J (5-10) 
l Pklk * ?f (5-11) 
0 < < b^ for all k (5-12) 
T fT cT The resulting optimal values and (g^ ,g^ ) are found 
fT cT and (g ,g ) is sent to management unit k. 
— K — K 
T Step 5. Management unit k solves Problem A and the values 
K 
A f T cT f T cT 
Z k ^ k '^k ^' ̂ k ' ̂ k a r e s e r v t t o t n e c e ntral unit. 
Step 6. The central unit checks to determine if any 
z"(gf^,g^) > for k=l,2,...,k. If an inequality exists, then a con-k —k — K K 
straint of the form (5-9) is added. Return to Step 4. If 
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z
k(gj,, >gk ) - f° r k=l,2,...,K, then stop. An optimal solution has 
been found to Problem IV. 
Once again, the central unit may apply trade-off weights and 
Q 0 to the objective function so that (5-8) becomes 
min[QAl a ) + Q (£ N .(vtht+v.h .)] (5-13) 
k j ~ _ 
The following comments are helpful in viewing the decision rule to sum-
mate the weighted client dissatisfaction: 
1. If the central unit places a higher priority upon mini­
mizing client dissatisfaction than upon minimizing internal 
tension (Q2 > > >Qi)» then, during the central unit-
administrator interaction, the administrator has little 
impact upon changing client-oriented goals and therefore 
the change in internal tension would be mainly dependent 
upon the administrator's influence upon funder-oriented 
goals. 
2. If the central unit places a higher priority upon mini­
mizing internal tension rather than client dissatisfac­
tion, then the administrators would have a large impact 
upon both funder-oriented and client-oriented goals. 
3. If the client need levels from the J groups are not 
clustered or do not have a unimodal type of distribution, 
then the resulting output from a summated weighted client 
dissatisfaction model may result in low utilization from 
all client groups. 
Comment 3 deserves further explanation and a simple example 
should be helpful. Suppose n_. is unidimensional and there are six 
groups. If the ideal value for groups 1, 2, and 3 are 4, 4, and 3, 
respectively, and the ideal value for groups 4, 5, and 6 are 10, 11, 
and 10, respectively, and all N.'s are equal, then the proposed output 
might result in a value between 6 and 7. The value of the proposed 
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output might then be considered too large for the first cluster 
(groups 1, 2, 3) and also too small for the second cluster (groups 4, 
5,6). In such a situation, utilization from all groups may be low, in 
which case it may be advisable to concentrate either on the first 
cluster or on the second cluster. 
Targeting a Client Group Which Minimizes 
the Sum of Internal Tension and Client Dissatisfaction 
From the standpoint of attempting to minimize internal tension 
plus client dissatisfaction and selecting the client group which has 
the minimum dissatisfaction, the objective function of such a problem 
may be written as 
min{£ z k(g k,g£) + min(y*ht+y~h~/j=l,2,...,J)} 
k j J J J J 
with the constraint set being the same as for Problem IV (i.e. (5-2)-
(5-7)] . The solution to this problem would not only provide the minimum 
of internal tension and client dissatisfaction, but also provide the 
client group which has a minimum dissatisfaction. Thus, it would pro­
vide the client group which the organization would seek to satisfy 
(i.e. the target group). However, this objective function is non-
convex and beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Therefore, in attempting to select a target group, consideration 
is given only to the minimum of the sum of internal tension and client 
dissatisfaction. That is, the group which is selected may not be the 
group which has the least amount of dissatisfaction. However, the group 
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that is selected is the one which provides for the minimum value of 
internal tension plus client dissatisfaction. 
In the following two subsections, two cases are considered. The 
first case is aimed at selecting a target group. The second case con­
siders a situation in which a target group has been selected. In addi­
tion, for each case, there may or may not be a concern for the dis­
satisfaction levels of the groups which are not targeted. 
Selecting a Target Group 
Given j=l,2,...,J client groups, it is desirable to find the 
group j=j such that the sum of internal tension and client group dis­
satisfaction is a minimum. In order to select a group, it is necessary 
to solve J problems of the form: 
Problem V(j), j=l,2,...,J 
+ (VTHT+VTH.)} 
- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 
(5-14) 
subject to 
I E I K X I K 
I E IK X IK -
I E IK X IK 
1 
^ F K + " F K 
: 5AK + ^ A K 
a . A . c u \ 
Id . + Id . -ck -ck 
J§k = ° 
= Ik 
J Ik = 2 




In. + In. = n. 
3 -3 "3 
(5-17) 
h., h. > 0 
3 -3 
(5-18) 
dfk> dfk * -° 
dak' dak * 2 
dck' dck * 2J 
^ for all k (5-19) 
x., > 
ik 
0 for all i, for all k (5-20) 
2 * «k * *k for all k (5-21) 
One might note that there is no concern for groups other than the 
one currently being considered. Problem V(j) can be partitioned as was 
Problem III. Since it is desirable to select the group for which the 
objective function is the minimum of all optimal objective functions, 
a simple comparison of the optimal objective functions would reveal the 
group associated with the minimum value. If that group were j=j, then 
f c 
the values of x_^ for all i and k, g^ and g^ associated with Problem 
V(j) at optimality would be used. 
If there is a concern for the dissatisfaction levels for groups 
other than the one which may finally be selected, then it would be 
desirable to keep the levels of dissatisfaction of the client groups 
139 
below a certain level Yj f° r 3=1»2,...,J. The level Yj would need to be 
predetermined by the central unit. Given concern for other groups, 
Problem V(j) may be modified by the addition of the following con­
straints : 
( v t h t + v . h . ) < Y • 
- 3 - 3 - 3 - 3 3 
I M kg^ - Ih+ + Ih~ = n.f> j=l,2,...,J. (5-22) 
hT, hT > 0 -3 "3 
Problem V(j) with restriction (5-22) will be termed Problem V(j'). 
Restrictions (5-22) limit the guideline goal levels sent to the 
administrators. This type of model may be applicable to the public 
sector, a service organization, or a monopoly, where the organization 
seeks to serve one specific client while maintaining the level of dis­
satisfaction of other clients within certain bounds. 
Although it may appear that an excessive amount of time and ef­
fort is required in determining the target client (J single client 
problems), it may be necessary for the organization to go through a 
"market survey" in order to determine which client the organization 
should seek to satisfy. 
Given a Target Group 
If the organization has selected a target group and has no con­
cern for the other groups then the problem facing the organization may 
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be described by Problem III in Chapter IV. On the other hand, concern 
for groups other than the target group may be incorporated by using 
Problem V(j') where the j used refers to the target group. 
Of course,the central unit may desire to consider trade-off 
weights and for internal tension and client dissatisfaction in 
either case described in this section. 
Minimizing the Sum of Internal Tension 
and Maximum Client Dissatisfaction 
The final model to be discussed in the multi-client/single out­
put situation is one in which the organization is attempting to minimize 
internal tension plus maximum client dissatisfaction. The objective 
function consists of terms related to the sum of weighted goal deviations 
of the management units and a term which specifies the largest value of 
dissatisfaction over all client groups. The problem may be stated as: 
Problem VI 
m i n { £ ( W f k d f k + W f ^ + 6} (5-23) 
subject to 
I Bfkxik " I d f k + I d f k - % = 2 
£ £ikXik *-ak + "'"-ak = ik 
- !<!. + Id- - Ig? = 0 y 
h £ikxik ^ck ' ̂ ~ck "sk 
£ikXik * g &k 
> k=l,2,...,K (5-24) 
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I p k § k a G-f (5-25) 
6 > VT hT + V.h. 
- ] - 3 - 3 - 3 
7 M. g.c - Iht + IhT = n. k-k ] -] ] 
h., h. > 0 
3 3 
> j=l,2,...,J (5-26) 
0 < g k < b k k=l,2,...,K (5-27) 
d' ,d > 0> for all k —ak —ak — (5-28) 
x., 2: 0 for all i, for all k ik ' (5-29) 
which may be solved by the goal partitioning procedure. 
Once again, in certain situations, it may be desirable to place 
an upper bound on the levels of dissatisfaction for one or more client 
groups other than the one which is maximally dissatisfied. For example, 
in a service organization, such as a library, an attempt to decrease 
the level of dissatisfaction of one group of users may lead to an 
increase in the level of dissatisfaction of another group of users due 
to a reallocation of resources. Since the second group of users may be 
accustomed to the current level of service received, a reduction of 
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services would be expected to produce an increase in client dissatis­
faction. If client dissatisfaction increases beyond a critical amount, 
called a threshold level, the client may not tolerate the level of dis­
satisfaction and may take action which might have serious repercussions 
for the organization. In such a case, the central unit may establish 
threshold levels to insure that dissatisfaction for each client group 
stays below the critical amount. In order to take into account the 
existence of a threshold level for the client groups the following set 
of constraints may be added to Problem VI. 
v t h t + vThT < Y . j=l,2,...,J (5-30) 
-3-3 3 
where y_. is the central unit's perceived threshold level for client 
group. 
Adding trade-off weights and Q^, the objective function for 
the central unit would be: 
min[Q1(5; a k) + Q 2(6)] 
k 
Summary 
In this chapter, multiple client groups, which can be described 
or segmented on the basis of their respective need levels are intro­
duced. If the organization is assumed to have a single output, three 
decision models of interest can be discussed. The first model describes 
the minimization of the sum of internal tension and weighted client 
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group dissatisfaction. In the objective function, priorities, speci­
fied by the central unit, are assigned to the dissatisfaction levels of 
each client group. In this model it would appear desirable to have 
clients with ideal need levels which are in some sense clustered or 
unimodal. 
The second model is related to selecting or having a target group. 
In selecting a target group, the group, which is targeted, is the one 
which minimizes the sum of internal tension plus the client dissatis­
faction for that group. If the organization has concern for the dis­
satisfaction of all client groups, then additional constraints may be 
added in order to keep the dissatisfaction levels within bounds. If a 
target group has been specified,threshold levels of dissatisfaction can 
be maintained for the other groups by additional constraints. 
The final model is related to the maximum client dissatisfaction 
over all groups. Thus the objective is to minimize internal tension 
plus maximum client dissatisfaction. As in the second model, it may be 
desirable to establish threshold levels for the client groups other than 
the one which is most dissatisfied. 
All of the models discussed in this chapter may be considered 
normative in nature and can be partitioned in a manner similar to the 
approach used for Problem III. For each model, an optimal solution 
can be determined. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DESCRIPTIVE MODELS OF THE INTERACTION PROCESS 
IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM 
Introduction 
In the last two chapters, solution procedures for several types 
of problems related to the resource allocation and goal setting process 
in an organizational system are examined. The solution procedures pro­
posed in Chapter IV have two major disadvantages from a behavioral 
viewpoint: (1) interaction between the central unit and the client 
occurred at the same time that interaction between the central unit and 
management unit occurs, and (2) the client evaluates proposed output as 
opposed to actual output from the organization. In this chapter, sev­
eral descriptive interactive models of the resource allocation and goal 
setting process are proposed which models differ from the previous 
models as follows: 
1. Interaction between the central unit and management units 
continues until a "satisfactory" allocation of central 
unit oriented goals and client-oriented goals for each 
management unit is attained. 
2. The output given to the client is based upon actual 
output of the management units and not upon the proposed 
output. 
3. Actual output is not given to the client until a "satis­
factory" allocation of goals for the management units is 
attained. 
4. Project redesign may be based not only upon preferences 
of the management unit but also the preferences of the 
client. 
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5. The client may seek to interact not only with the central 
unit but also with the management units. 
The differences noted above are more in line with a description 
of an actual process in an organizational system [7,8,50,95] and may 
be considered as descriptive models in contrast to the normative models 
in the previous chapters. 
Let's consider each group in the organizational system separately 
along with the decision problem facing each group and the information 
that may be transferred to the other groups (the process itself is con­
sidered as an interactive one among the three major groups). 
With respect to the client, again assume that he can specify a 
desired level for each choice criterion and the levels can be described 
by the vector n, dimension (rxl). But now assume that the client is in 
a position to evaluate the actual output of the organization (defined 
by the (rxl) vector G J rather than the proposed output G^. 
In the partial utilization case, the client's decision problem, 
using actual output and the same notation defined in Chapter IV, may be 
described using a goal programming formulation as: 
Problem U 
min V(G c) = (v +y ++v~y~) (6-1) 
subject to (G )a. + G a_ - Iy + + Iy" = n (6-2) -c 1 alt 2 - - -
a + a 2 = 1 (6-3) 
y +, y" £ 0 (6-4) 
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oî ci > 0 (6-5) 
If, upon solving the above problem, the utilization variable 
= 1, then the output would be fully utilized by the client and, with 
regard to the organization, the central unit and administrators should 
be satisfied with the client's utilization of the product or service. 
As a matter of fact, there may be some level a" < 1, such that if > 
a", the indivuals in the organization would be satisfied with the utili 
zation of their product or service. However, if the resulting is 
zero, then the client would be fully utilizing the best available alter 
native and for < a", the organization would be dissatisfied with the 
client's utilization of the organization's product or service. 
To take the analysis one step further, there may also exist an 
upper bound < 1, on the utilization variable which the organization 
might desire to have utilization remain below. An upper bound may be 
desirable in order to avoid possible legal difficulties associated with 
having a monopoly. Thus the organization may desire to have the client 
utilization within the range a < < a^. In the following discussion 
it is assumed that oP = 1. Let's now consider the reasons the client 
might change his utilization of the organization's product or service. 
In order for the utilization of the organization's output to 
change, one or more of the following must occur: (1) the attributes of 
the best available alternative G ^ change, (2) the priorities v +, v 
change, (3) the criterion levels n change, or (4) the attributes of the 
organization's output G change. It is assumed that the organization 
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has no control over the attributes of the best available alternative 
G , . It should be mentioned that there are instances where this -alt 
assumption would not hold. For example, some companies provide product 
specifications to other companies in order to assure that there is a 
competitor. The v , v + or even the criterion levels n may be changed 
through such means as advertising and educating. But one obvious 
approach for the organization to undertake, in order to increase utili­
zation, is to change the organization's output G^. The question is: 
How should the organization's output change? 
If the client would provide the organization with directional in­
formation regarding how the client's dissatisfaction with the available 
outputs (assuming that the client's objective function is a measure of 
need dissatisfaction) might change with changes in the attributes of 
the product or service, then the organization would, in a sense be 
guided by the client's needs. 
Within the organization, the central unit—management unit 
interaction, in which the central unit is seen as attempting to establish 
goals for each management unit in order to minimize the total internal 
tension of the organization, takes place. If total internal tension is 
minimized, then "organizational optimality" is said to be achieved. 
It would then be necessary to determine if the output would be viewed as 
an improvement with respect to customer requirements. If no improvement 
is seen, then, using customer feedback, the administrators may attempt 
to redesign their alternatives subject to technological constraints in 
order to improve the output. 
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If the organization's output is viewed as an improvement with 
respect to customer requirements, then the organizational output is sent 
to the customer, who determines the amount of utilization. The customer 
would then provide feedback to the organization and the improvement 
process would repeat. 
The feedback to the organization may be sent to the central unit, 
who, in turn, specifies client-oriented goals for each subordinate 
(termed indirect influence) or to the management units, who would 
determine the client-oriented goals themselves (termed direct influence). 
Interactive models incorporating both "indirect client influence" and 
"direct client influence" are presented in the following sections. 
A description of the process for which models are developed is 
as follows: 
a. Central unit—management unit interaction in order to 
determine goal guidelines for the management unit which 
consider total goal discrepancy dissatisfaction of the 
management units and client dissatisfaction. 
b. Actual output is sent to the client for evaluation. 
c. The central unit or management unit receives feedback 
from the client for the purpose of improving output. 
d. A determination of whether or not the client utiliza­
tion is satisfactory and, if satisfactory—stop; if not 
continue. 
e. Central unit—management unit interaction to determine 
a new set of goal guidelines using customer feedback 
until there can be no further decrease in internal 
tension. 
f. Central unit checks if the new output is "improved" 
with respect to customer requirements, and if "improved," 
return to (b), if not "improved," client information is 
used by the management unit for project redesign. 
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g. If feasible to redesign and "improve" output, return to 
(a); if not feasible to redesign and "improve" output, 
stop. 
A diagram of the interaction process described above is presented in 
Figure 6. 
Improving Organizational Output 
-1 
Given an organizational output G^ = G^ and the assumption that 
the client's selection process can be described by Problem U, let 
(3^,y"'") be a (lx(r+l)) vector of optimal dual multipliers associated 
with Problem U. Using the simplex optimality criterion, if ( - 3 G c~u) < 0 , 
then it is possible to find a lower value of the objective function 
(i.e. lower dissatisfaction) by increasing the value of a^. 
The problem then becomes Problem U with a variable column vector 
if the organization is willing to change G^. The client may influ­
ence the change by providing the organization with information regarding 
the dual variables. The actual output is assumed dependent upon the 
activity levels selected by the management units. Assuming that the 
management unit solves Problem A^, the actual output related to the 
v c client is given by £ p. x. for management unit k. The management unit 
— I K lK 
1 
outputs are then combined to form the actual client output by 
G = y M, (y p?, x.,) -c k h -ik ik k i 
It will be useful to define the actual client-oriented output 
from management unit k by g^ = \ V^y?*^ t n u s 
i 
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CENTRAL UNIT MANAGEMENT UNIT k 
(1) Arbitrarily select 
(3) Check for "organizational^ 
optimality": 
a. If not "optimal," 
establish new goals 
0 ^ 
b. If "optimal," send 
actual output to 
client 
(2) Allocate resources to alter­
natives initially selected 
-(5) Client Utilization check: 
a. Satisfactory—Stop. 
b. Unsatisfactory 
(6) Determine goal 
allocation for 
management units Goals M9) 
P i s s a t i s f ^ i g ^ 
(7) Check for "organizational J$ 
optimality": 
a. If not "optimal," 
establish new goals 
(10) 
/ 
b. If optimal, check 
for client relevance 
Allocate resources to avail­
able alternatives 
. OF/ -Y 
(8) Check if output "improved" <>7/J>> 
a. No--send client 
info to management units 
b. Yes—send actual 
output to client 





b. No improvement-Stop 
Determine utilization and 
feedback for output 
"improvement" 
Figure 6. Interaction Process in an Organizational System 
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k k 1 
Thus, in order to increase client utilization, the organization, 
given (3^",P^) from the client, would attempt to 
1- 1 minimize ( - 3 G -u ) - -c 
min - B ^ g ^ + y 1 ) 
k 
min - i l l ! l M k P i k x i k + p l ) 
k i 
where the decision variable is x., . 
ik 
V v 1 c 1 If min - (l I 3 M p. x. +p ) < 0, then the actual output associ-
k i 
ated with this maximization would be seen as an improvement by the 
client. Two approaches will be used to describe the process of improving 
the client output within the organization. In the first approach, 
termed "indirect influence," the central unit uses the client feedback 
to change the client-oriented goals for the management units. In the 
second approach, termed "direct influence," the management units use the 
client feedback to determine the client-oriented goals. The client-
oriented goals would-then be used in Problem A^. Details of both in-
direct and direct influence are described in the following two sections. 
Before doing that, let's consider the client and his interaction with 
the organization. 
. . . . -1 
The client is initially given G^ from the organization and solves 
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Problem U. If V ( G ^ ) , the optimal value, is greater than zero indicating 
+ + - -
m m v y + v y 
subject to ( G 1 ) ^ + (G2)a? + G ,,a 0 - Iy + + Iy = n -c 1 -c 1 -alt 2 - -
1 2 « 1 + a + a 2 = 1 
1 2 o^, a 1 ? a 2 > 0 
2 2 2 Problem U is solved and a new set of dual variables (3 ,y ) is found 
1 2 
and sent to the organization along with (a^+a^) in order to determine if 
dissatisfaction, then it may be advantageous from the client's viewpoint 
to provide feedback to the organization. The organization's output, 
which would now be considered as a variable vector, is altered and a 
-2 . 
second output G is given to the client for evaluation. However, if 
1 2 1 
-(3 Gc+y ) - °> then the organization would not be providing a more 
desirable output and other action, such as project redesign (which is 
discussed later) would need to be taken. 
1 2 1 ^2 If -(3 G +y ) > 0, then G would not be desirable, since under the - -c -c 
"2 
simplex selection criterion, this would mean that the vector G^ would not 
enter the basis. 
1 2 1 
On the other hand, if -(3 G^ +y ) < 0, then the new output could 




another output should be proposed. At iteration Q, the problem becomes 
Problem 
+ + 
min v y + v y 
Q 
r ~Q Q + -
subject to I Ĝ ct£ + 9 ait a2 ~ ^ Y . + ^ Y . = n q=l ° " d 
q 
> 0, q=l,2,...,Q, a 2 > 0 
The final output is seen as a convex combination of the outputs 
-1 ~2 ~Q 
G , G G , . . . , G ^ . Thus the final output desired by the client would be 
G = I 6 -c ,̂ -c q=l 




F . . . . ~F 
and is the client utilization of the organization's output G ^ . The 
client's problem is viewed as a generalized linear program [33] in which 
G is a variable vector contained in a convex set C. -c 
It would be desirable to know if only a finite number of itera­
tions are required until the organization would not be able to produce 
an improved output with the current set of projects. A theorem given by 
Dantzig [33, p.438] and reworded for its application in the context pre­
sented here is stated as: 
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Theorem 4-3. Only a finite number of iterations of the simplex algo­
rithm is required if each basic feasible solution to Problem U is 
improved by introducing into the basis an extreme point e C, where C 
-c 
is a convex set, and is chosen such that ' -c 
- ( p ^ - ^ + S ^ - 1 ^ ) = min - ( B ^ - ^ G tM^" 1') < 0 - -c - -c 
where ( 3 ^ ~^,y^ are the simplex multipliers of the basis of Prob-
lem U ^ 1 ' . 
It is necessary to show that C is a convex set. First of all, a 
convex set is defined as follows: 
Definition. A set of points is called a convex set if all points on the 
straight line joining any two points in the set belong to the set. 
It can be noted that G is a function of the activity levels 
c J 
Xik' sP e cifi c ally 
6 c = I V I Ei^ik' k 1 
C can be defined as the set 
k i 
for all k and x^ k > 0, for all i, k} 
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Thus e C will imply that x^ k satisfies 
r £ 1 £ 1 
I P £ k x £ k - S k f° r a l l K and x . v > 0 for all i, and k. ik 
"1 ~ 2 It must be shown that given any two points G and G contained in -c -c 
:V " 1 ~ 2 
C, then G , a convex combination of G and G , is also contained in C. 
-c -c 
P r o o f . Let G 1 e C, G 2 e C and G* = AG 1 + (l-A)G2 where 0 < A < 1. c c c c 
k i , V * ^ik~ik k l 
k î 
Let x ik 
1 2 Ax.. + (l-A)x., for all i, and k. ik ik ' 
Then 
•ik ik h ̂ ik^ ik i I 
= A I 2ik x ik + ( 1 _ A ) I e-
£ 2 
^ikxik 
* AIk + ( 1 " A ) I k = Ik 
Thus G^ = I M k(£ P? kxV k) = AG c + (l-A)Gc implies £ p ^ x ^ < g* and since 
1 2 k 1 * 1 L2 
Xik , Xik ~ 0 a n d 0 - A - 1 t n e n = A x ^ k + ( 1 _ A^ xik ~ 0 ; t n e r e f o r e 
G'C e C and C is a convex set and Theorem 4-3 holds, c 
Thus, in the planning process, the organization is seen as inter­
acting with a client to produce a more acceptable output to the client 
based upon the values of the simplex multipliers associated with 
Problem U q. Let's now consider the interaction process using indirect 
client influence. 
Indirect Client Influence 
Assume that the central unit receives feedback from the client in 
the form of dual variables (3^,M^) and £ a q. If £ a q < a , then the 
central unit would seek to minimize (-$q(£ M^g^)-^) . Since the central 
unit is assumed only to provide goal guidelines for the management 
units, the central unit would not be able to specify the actual client-
^ c c oriented output for the management unit g but only the guideline g, . 
— K — K 
Thus the central unit would use the guideline instead of the actual out­
put and would attempt to minimize(-$q Y M,g!~-y^). 
K —K 
The problem for management unit k is described by Problem A^ and 
K 
using the concepts developed in the partitioning process discussed in 
Chapter IV, the problem for the central unit for determining a (q+l)st 
output at some central unit-management unit iteration T-l would be 
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Problem F(I) 
minfQ̂ X a k)+Q 2y} (6-6) 
k 




Y * M 2(I Mkik)-^) (6-8) 
I Pkik * ?f ( 6 " 9 ) k 
0 < < b k for all k (6-10) 
w h e r e a n d a r e t r a d e - o f f w e i g h t s a s s i g n e d t o i n t e r n a l t e n s i o n a n d 
client output improvement. Constraint (6-7) consists of the level of 
( 5'c ft ct ̂  
internal tension for management unit k [ z k(g k ,gk )J , the contribution 
ft ft ct ct 
+ 7 T u Sv ) t o level of dissatisfaction by the central unit and 
— k —K — K —K 
client goals, and an estimate of dissatisfaction caused by the new goals 
to be determined at iteration T. Constraint (6-8) is related to deter­
mining a new set of client goals which may contribute toward lowering 
client dissatisfaction. 
If <<< Q 2, then the central unit would be placing a high 
emphasis upon client satisfaction and a small emphasis upon the 
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fT cT management units' dissatisfaction. Letting (g ,g, ) be the solution to 
— K — K 
cT 
Problem F(I), then, since g^ , k=l,2,...,K are guidelines, even though 
the "improved output" criterion is satisfied, that is, 
the actual output determined by the administrators by solving Problem 
A^, may not result in the above criterion being satisfied. That is, 
if x_ k̂ denotes the optimal solution for Problem A^ using g^ and g^ , 
~cT r c T q r *cT q then g, = ) p. x., and ( - 3 ) M g -\i ) may not be less than zero. 
-K . —lK IK - , K K 
1 k 
This leads to an observation which is similar to one stated in Chapter 
IV. 
Observation. Even if the central unit is able to establish client-
oriented goals which would lead to an improved output, the actual man­
agement unit outputs may not result in an improved output. 
Similarly, at least two explanations for the actual output not 
resulting in an improvement are (1) that the guidelines suggest activity 
levels which do not satisfy the exogenous inequality constraints of 
Problem A^ and (2) that low priorities may be assigned by the admin­
istrator to client-oriented goals. 
Two observations, related to extreme forms of behavior and given 
in Chapter IV, may also apply for the indirect client influence. The 
propositions are restated here, however, the explanations are not 
repeated. 
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Observation. If the central unit emphasizes the minimization of in­
ternal tension and/or administrators place a low priority upon achieving 
client-oriented goals, then improved client output would occur only if 
it were a by-product of achieving central unit and/or administrator-
oriented goals. 
Observation. If the central unit emphasizes the flexibility of the 
organization to respond to client dissatisfaction and administrators 
place high priorities upon client-oriented goals, then the organization 
appears to act as though it were controlled by the client. 
An information flow diagram for indirect client influence is 
given in Figure 7. 
In the next section direct client influence is described. 
Direct Client Influence 
In this section, it is assumed that the central unit has no con­
trol over the client-oriented goals. The administrator of a management 
unit is seen as taking the information directly from the client (with 
an appropriate transformation) and determining the client-oriented goals. 
Since the central unit has no control over client-oriented goals, 
the problem for the central unit is written as: 
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CENTRAL UNIT MANAGEMENT UNIT k 
G 1 - c 
1 
( 1 ) A r b i t r a r i l y s e l e c t cA , & y ^ r ( 2 ) S o l v e Prob lem A^ 
( 3 ) " Check a k < z j ^ g j ^ 1 , ^ 1 ) 
S o l v e P rob lem 0-4 ( g f t , g v ) n,\ o i n ui A „ __ ^ - k - k ,.(4) S o l v e P r o b l e m A. Set t = 2 k 
(̂g>v '^Vc^ 
t * f t c t 
(5) Check a k > z k ( g k , | k ) , 
f o r a l l k 
a . N o — S o l v e P r o b l e m 0-4 
t = t + l 
b . Y e s — S e n d a c t u a l o u t p u t 
t o c l i e n t 
•(7) Check £ a q > a 
q 
a . Y e s — S t o p ( 8 ) S o l v e P r o b l e m A, 
(9) Check a£ > z ^ g ^ . g j ^ ) , 
f o r a l l k / ^ 
a . N o — S o l v e Prob lem F ( I ) 
b . Y e s — C h e c k I m p r o v e d o u t p u t 
S 
( 1 0 ) Check - 3 q G ( q + 1 ) - y q < 0 - - c 
a . Y e s — s e n d 
b . N o — S t o p 
- - c 
a . Y e s — s e n d t o c l i e n t ^ q ? * ^ 
I a q , ( 3 q , y q ) ^ 
— ( 6 ) C l i e n t 
S o l v e P r o b l e m U 
F i g u r e 7 . I n f o r m a t i o n F l o w D i a g r a m — I n d i r e c t C l i e n t I n f l u e n c e 
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Problem F(D) 
min J a (6-11) 
k K 
-i * , , . *, ft ct. ft ft x ft f l n , subject to a k > z k(g R ,gR ) - ^ g R + 7JK g R (6-12) 
for t=l,2,...,T-1, k=l,2,...,K 
I pklk * 5 F < 6 - 1 3 > 
k 
Thus the central unit can only change central unit oriented goals. 
The organization is assumed to receive (3 q,y q) and from the 
client. If < a^, then improvement would occur if 
min-(3q(j; M k| k)+u q) < 0 
k 
Since y q is a constant, 
min-(3q I M kg k+y q) = -y q + min-Cj ? \ § £ ) . 
k k 
Letting r q = 3 M, and dropping the constant y , the result is —k — k 
min- I(rqgk) 
k 
where r k is a (l*c) vector. However, each administrator determines its 
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Q 
own g , therefore the above maximization is separable into K components 
— K 
q - C 
Referring to Problem , and recalling that = I 2ik Xik' ^ "*"S 
i 
seen that there are restrictions on the x ^ , namely 
I Eik xik s Sk 
1 
(where the x^ k < 1 for i=l,2,...,nk are included in this constraint). 
Thus, using the transformed client feedback r q a client feedback prob-
K 




m i H EkEikxik ( 6 " l i t ) 
1 
;ubject to I P^ kx i k < g k (6-15) 
i 
x.. > 0 for all i (6-16) ik 
Let x^ k, for all i, be the optimal solution to Problem B*. 
Since the solution to Problem B q does not take into account central unit 
k 
goals or management unit goals and the resulting £ Pikxik wou-'-c* ^ e ^ e 
i 
best output from unit k with respect to the client, it is reasonable to 
V C A Q Q 
let I Pikxlk ^ e u s e c * a s ^ e cli e nt-oriented goals. Therefore, given r>k 
i 
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from the client, the management unit would solve Problem to find the 
c q r c a q t client-oriented goals g ^ = l p. x. which are used in Problem A, and 
—K . — I K I K K 1 
remain fixed during the central unit-management unit interaction. The 
interaction process for direct client interaction is illustrated in 
Figure 8. 
Additional Considerations 
Although it has been assumed throughout that the administrator 
determines the weights assigned to deviations from goal levels, surely 
it would be naive to think that the central unit has no influence over 
the determination of the weights in many instances. For example, when 
threshold levels are established for minimizing minimum or maximum 
client dissatisfaction, the central unit may exert a great deal of pres­
sure upon the administrators to insure that the threshold levels are 
not exceeded. In these situations, the goal guidelines might actually 
become constraints. However, pressure exerted by the central unit on 
the managers for the purpose of changing their assigned weights to goal 
deviations is difficult to explain mathematically. One possible expla­
nation might be that the goals of the administrator are directly re­
lated to the goals established by the central unit and attainment of 
administrator goals are dependent upon the administrator's attainment 
of the central unit's goals. In this situation, high priorities given 
to administrator-oriented goals by the administrator necessarily imply 
high priorities given to the central unit's goals. 
Other concepts which could easily be incorporated into the models 
discussed in this dissertation are the following: 
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CENTRAL UNIT MANAGEMENT UNIT k 
fl t\ cl 
G 1 -c 
(1) Arbitrarily select g k £^^,(2) Arbitrarily select , solve 
Problem A.̂" k 
(3) Check o k < z*(gf .g'1) f t 
Solve Problem F(D) (4) Solve Problem A, 
(5) Check ct£ > z^g^.g^ 1) 
for all k 
No—Solve Problem F(D) 
t=t+l 
Yes—Send actual output 
to client 





^ S L H ^ — — z — 
(10) Check a£ > z * ^ , ^ ) , 
for all k 
a. No—Solve Problem F(D) 
b. Yes—Check improved output 





(9) Solve Problem A. 
/ 
(11) Check - 3 q G q + 1 - n q < 0 - -c 
a. Yes—Send to client 
b. No—Stop 
I a q,(3 q,P q) 
3 Z 
G q + 1 (q=q+l) 
Client 
(6) Solve Problem U q 
I 
Figure 8. Information Flow Diagram—Direct Client Influence 
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1. Aspiration Level. Without increasing mathematical diffi­
culty, the problem for the management unit may be modified for taking 
into account a "discouragement zone" where the incentive power is re­
duced if the actual performance is outside the range of full impact of 
the goal. The changes in the model were described in the discussion of 
Collomb's [30] work in Chapter III. 
2. Goal Interval Programming. Another concept related to 
Collomb's work allows for acceptable goal intervals within which actual 
performance is acceptable. Again, no mathematical difficulty is intro­
duced if goal intervals rather than specific goal levels are used. 
3. Minimizing the Central Unit's Goal Dissatisfaction. 
Collomb allows for the central unit to have specific goal levels and 
minimize deviations from these levels while minimizing internal tension. 
However, by using the actual performance of the administrators rather 
than the goal guidelines and by also attempting to minimize internal 
tension, the result is a non-convex programming problem which must be 
solved by a centralized solution procedure. And the behavioral appeal 
of the model is lost when a centralized solution procedure is required. 
Hence, Ruefli [90] has proposed a model in which the goal guidelines are 
used. In order to allow for minimizing the central unit's goal dis­
satisfaction, the term Q (u +s ++u s ) could be added to the objective 
function of the central unit and the goal programming constraint 
) P.g„ - Is + + Is = G may be added to the constraint set of the ? l-fk o J k 
central unit for any of the models discussed in Chapers IV, V, and VI. 
In summary, two approaches are presented for determining a 
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"better" vector of client goal levels g^. Both approaches use infor-
mation from the client to change the current client-oriented goals. 
This information (the dual variables) provides guidelines of how much 
the client's dissatisfaction with output would decrease per unit change 
in the product attributes. The first approach allows the superordinate 
to select new client-oriented goal levels by solving problem F(I). In 
the second approach, the information is transformed into a form that is 
usable by administrator k (the dual variables are multiplied by the 
transformation matrix M^)* Using the transformed information, the 
administrator finds the "best" set of projects and their respective 
activity levels by Problem B . The solution of Problem B provides the 
k k 
CQ t new client-oriented goallevels (g, ) for Problem A . The central unit 
— K K 
is seen as being able to influence only the central unit oriented goals 
by solving Problem F(D). 
Additional concepts which could be directly incorporated into the 
models discussed in this dissertation included aspiration levels, goal 
interval programming, and minimizing the central unit's goal dissatis­
faction . 
Project Redesign 
Consider now the problem which arises if the organization did 
not provide a more desirable output, which is signified by 
-(M q+6 qG q + 1) > 0. If it appears as though the new output G q + 1 would 
not be acceptable to the client, then it may be necessary to redesign the 
projects. 
Suppose the values of each attribute of project i of management 
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unit k are constrained by technological considerations of the form 
A i k E i k £ 5 I K 
where A., is a matrix relating the vector of project attributes and D., ik -ik 
is a vector of technological stipulations. 
Recall that, given guidance by the client in the form of the dual 
variables 3 q , it is desirable to 
min - 3 q G c = min - 3 q I = min - 3 q I M (]> ) 
k k i 
= min - Y Y 3 M.p..x.. = min - Y Y rqp.. x.. ft* - l-ik ik ? v -k-ik ik k 1 k i 
where r q = 3qM, . -k - k 
Administrator k receives a r. and is asked to min - Y r^p^x., . -k h -k-ik ik l 
Q C Since rvp., is simply a scalar, it would be desirable to make each co-
- K— IK 
efficient as large as possible. Given that it is necessary to redesign, 
the r, becomes a vector of coefficients for the vector of client--k 
oriented attributes of project i, P^, which is variable subject to 
technological consideration. Thus, the redesign problem for project i 
may be written as 
q c 
m l n TicEik 
subject to A. kp. k < D . 
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Note, however, that p., consists of tour components, p!, , p?, , 
-ik r ' *-±k -ik 
c £ 
p^^ and p^^ and no guidance is provided for desirable attribute levels 
for the f, a, or £ components. But the administrator has information in 
f a £ 
the form of dual variables of Problem A^, ( t t ^ , 7 ^ , t t ^ ), which would aid 
in determining new attributes for the purpose of minimizing the internal 
tension. 
A new project would be more desirable, i.e. considered for 
acceptance, if the simplex optimality criterion were not satisfied which 
occurs if min ( - T r p.,) < 0. Thus it would be desirable to minimize — k — i k 
f f k a c c £ £ 
_\^ik = "^^ik^k^ik^kSik'^kSik^' ( T h i s minimization is similar to 
one described by Ruefli [91] and discussed in Chapter IV.) This re­
design problem may be written as: 
Problem RDA.. ik— 
min - t t p., (6-17) —k—iK 
subject to A.,p., < D (6-18) 
lK—lK —lK 
In Problem RDA., , the project is redesigned based upon an attempt, on ik 
the part of the administrator, to minimize the weighted deviations from 
his goals. Although the administrator is seen as redesigning the 
Q 
client-oriented attributes, p ^ , in order to better satisfy the current 
client-oriented goals, the change is dependent upon the administrator's 
priorities. Hence, client information is not directly utilized in the 
redesign phase. 
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However, the administrator may desire to include guidance from 
the client in the redesign phase, in which case, r^ would replace tt . 
The problem may be written as: 
Problem RDC. ik— 
min -{Qi( îk> * v&ik'&L-iMk" (6-19) 
Aikpik s 5 ik ( 6 - 1 8 ) 
where and are non-Archimedian weights which allow the administrator 
to determine whether priority is given to client-oriented attributes or 
non-client-oriented attributes. In the former case, >>> and in 
the latter case, >>> Q-̂ . The modified simplex procedure suggested by 
Sang Lee [73] can be used to easily solve Problem RDC^. Although the 
constraint set (6-18) is defined by a system of linear inequalities, 
that is, the attributes are defined as linearly dependent, Dantzig [33] 
shows that as long as p., is chosen from a general convex set, no dif-
— I K 
ficulties exist. 
The redesigned project p!, from Problem RDA., or RDC. may then 
— I K l K I K 
be inserted into the administrator's set of alternatives and is added as 
an additional column in Problem A^. However, it is important to note 
that if -tt, p'i ^ 0, then the redesigned project would not need to be 
— K — l K 
considered for entrance into an administrator's portfolio of active 
projects since it would not be advantageous for the purpose of minimiz­
ing the value of the administrator's objective function. This means 
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that even if Problem RDC^ produced a project which would be an 
improvement with respect to the client's desires, it is still necessary 
for that project to contribute toward minimizing the administrator's 
internal tension before the administrator would consider allocating 
resources to the project. 
Dantzig [33, Ch. 22] shows that the solution procedure is finite 
and if any project added to Problem A, is not active, it may be dropped 
K 
from administrator k's portfolio because it is included in the convex 
set defining the redesigned projects. In summary it can be stated that 
if a project is redesigned by solving Problem RDA^ or RDC^ and 
-ir p!, < 0, then inclusion of the project in a portfolio should decrease —k— i k 
an administrator's internal tension. In addition, if a project is re­
designed by solving Problem RDC., with priority given to client-oriented 
± K 
attributes and -tt p! < 0, then inclusion of the project should not only 
K — I K 
decrease an administrator's internal tension, but also contribute toward 
producing an improved client output. 
Of course, if the redesigned projects are included in the prob­
lems of the administrators and -(y^+B^G^) remains greater than or equal 
to zero, then the new output would not result in increased client utili­
zation. A flow diagram of project redesign is given in Figure 9. The 
redesign process may be used with both direct and indirect client in­
fluence; however, with indirect influence it is necessary for the cen­
tral unit to provide additional information, 3 qM , to each administrator. 
— K 
Referring to Figures 7 and 8, if ( - 3 q G q + 1 - y q ) > 0 (Step 10, Figure 7 




( ) Check -f3 qG q + 1 - u q < 0 
(Step 10, Fig. 7 or 
Step 11, Fig. 8) 
Yes--Send to Client 
No—Send r , q = ^ 
- k 
to Mgt Unit k 
Management Unit k 
(R-l) For a specific project type i, 
Redesign by either R^C^ or 
R D A i k U s i n g -k 
Bik 
T t (R-2) Check if tt p i k > 0 
a. No—Stop 
b. Yes—Use p!, as an / -ik 
additional project 
( ) Solve Problem A, with addi-
k 
tion project (Step 8, Fig. 7 
or Step 9, Fig. 8) 
Figure 9. Project Redesign 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this research is to develop analytical models of 
a resource allocation-decision making process within a hierarchical 
decentralized organization which models include the influence of a 
client upon the output provided by the organization. Mathematical 
programming models [45,30,91] which describe the interaction among 
levels in the organization, have been reported. However, the client 
of the organization is not explicitly considered in the decision-making 
process for resource allocation within the organization. In another 
literature, a group of researchers in marketing have taken an approach 
(Fishbein's attitude model [43]) to determine the attributes of a 
product, attribute levels desired and priorities associated with the 
attributes as viewed by a client in order to predict buying or using 
preferences of the client. However, there has been little or no con­
cern as to the manner in which this information is integrated into the 
decision-making environment of the organization. To date, no one has 
formally integrated the research in both areas. 
It is believed that conceptual, analytical models of organiza­
tional decision-making processes can provide insights and knowledge 
about how the flow of information and the organizational structure can 
affect decision making. The use of analytical models provides the 
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precision required for describing interaction. Several normative models 
of an organizational decision system, which reflects the influence of 
the major participants within the organization and the client, and 
which tie together the work of organization theorists and marketing 
researchers, are developed in the dissertation. Research in the area of 
mathematical decomposition is used as a basis for specifying overall 
problems facing an organizational decision-making system. Several 
models, describing different decision-making environments, are developed 
when the organization is viewed as serving a number of client groups. 
The descriptive models of Chapter VI provide a link between 
research centered upon the client and research centered upon the organi­
zation. For the organization theorist, this work may hopefully be an 
initial step in being able to analytically describe observed behaviors 
in an organizational system. 
Recommendation for Future Research 
Incorporation of the models of an organizational decision system 
into a simulation model of an organizational system may provide impor­
tant insights into the interaction process. Many factors, which were 
not incorporated into the models proposed, can be included in a simula­
tion model. Illustrative of the considerations which could be included 
are: 
1. The uncertainty involved in planning. As the planning 
process develops, uncertainty tends to decrease [31]. 
2. The stress upon individuals in the system. A behavioral 
submodel which changes priorities or goals of the man­
agement unit or client may be incorporated when stress 
exceeds threshold levels. 
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3. The incorporation of risk prone and risk averse behavior. 
Individual characteristics of a decision maker may change 
the structure of his problem [99]. 
4. Group behavior. The formation of coalitions may alter 
the responses and information flows. 
5. Learning. Over time, management units may ascertain 
which goals are more easily changed. 
6. Perception. The perception of product attributes and 
goal levels may differ from the actual attributes or 
goal levels specified. 
Since the models used were linear, further development by mathe­
matical programmers of non-linear models, which accurately reflect the 
relationships among the salient variables, need to be developed. For 
behavioral appeal, it would be desirable for solution procedures to be 
decentralized in order to reflect the interactions among the major 
participants. 
Since the work in this dissertation is focused on a single out­
put, models of organizational decision systems, in which the organiza­
tion provides multiple outputs, would be of interest. Also, other forms 
of objective functions (e.g. non-linear) may more accurately reflect 
actual decision-making behavior. 
Two distinct types of behavioral studies might be of interest. 
The first type would be aimed at testing and validating the assumptions 
made about the interactions and reactions of the major participants. 
It would be necessary to compare the number of central unit-management 
unit interactions, which occur before termination is reached, with the 
number of iterations required by the model before termination. Insight 
might be gained in determining how initial goals are set and how far 
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from optimality the actual solutions are. 
The second type of study would entail a discussion and implemen­
tation of the goal setting and interaction concepts proposed with man­
agers and determining the difficulties inherent in the implementation 
of an organizational decision-making system. 
Finally, the application of interactive modelling concepts [4-7, 
48,4-0], which do not require the specification an objective function, 
but instead, make use of trade-off decisions by individual managers, 
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